Development of a computer-aided fault tree synthesis methodology for quantitative risk analysis in the chemical process industry by Wang, Yanjun
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER-AIDED FAULT TREE 
SYNTHESIS METHODOLOGY FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK 
ANALYSIS IN THE CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
YANJUN  WANG 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Chemical Engineering
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER-AIDED FAULT TREE 
SYNTHESIS METHODOLOGY FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK 
ANALYSIS IN THE CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRY 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
YANJUN  WANG 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
  
 
____________________________
M. Sam Mannan 
(Chair of Committee) 
 Harry H. West 
(Member) 
 
 
____________________________ 
  
 
____________________________
Tom L. Teague 
(Member) 
 Jianer Chen 
(Member) 
 
 
____________________________ 
Kenneth R. Hall 
(Head of Department) 
 
December 2004 
 
Major Subject: Chemical Engineering 
 
 
iii
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Development of a Computer-Aided Fault Tree Synthesis Methodology for Quantitative 
Risk Analysis in the Chemical Process Industry. (December 2004) 
Yanjun Wang, B.En., Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
 
 
There has been growing public concern regarding the threat to people and 
environment from industrial activities, thus more rigorous regulations. The investigation 
of almost all the major accidents shows that we could have avoided those tragedies with 
effective risk analysis and safety management programs. High-quality risk analysis is 
absolutely necessary for sustainable development.  
As a powerful and systematic tool, fault tree analysis (FTA) has been adapted to 
the particular need of chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) and found 
great applications. However, the application of FTA in the chemical process industry 
(CPI) is limited. One major barrier is the manual synthesis of fault trees. It requires a 
thorough understanding of the process and is vulnerable to individual subjectivity. The 
quality of FTA can be highly subjective and variable. 
The availability of a computer-based FTA methodology will greatly benefit the 
CPI. The primary objective of this research is to develop a computer-aided fault tree 
synthesis methodology for CPQRA. The central idea is to capture the cause-and-effect 
logic around each item of equipment directly into mini fault trees. Special fault tree 
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models have been developed to manage special features. Fault trees created by this 
method are expected to be concise. A prototype computer program is provided to 
illustrate the methodology. Ideally, FTA can be standardized through a computer 
package that reads information contained in process block diagrams and provides 
automatic aids to assist engineers in generating and analyzing fault trees. 
Another important issue with regard to QRA is the large uncertainty associated 
with available failure rate data. In the CPI, the ranges of failure rates observed could be 
quite wide. Traditional reliability studies using point values of failure rates may result in 
misleading conclusions. This dissertation discusses the uncertainty with failure rate data 
and proposes a procedure to deal with data uncertainty in determining safety integrity 
level (SIL) for a safety instrumented system (SIS). Efforts must be carried out to obtain 
more accurate values of those data that might actually impact the estimation of SIL. This 
procedure guides process hazard analysts toward a more accurate SIL estimation and 
avoids misleading results due to data uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Risk Analysis in the Chemical Process Industry 
Risk is defined as a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or 
economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury, 
damage, or loss (CCPS, 2000). Risk analysis involves the development of an overall 
estimation of risk by gathering and integrating information about scenarios, frequencies 
and consequences, and it is one major component of the whole risk management process 
of a particular enterprise. In the process of risk analysis, both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques can be used, as shown in Figure 1.1 (Krishna et al., 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries.  
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Figure 1.1 The process of risk analysis (Krishna et al., 2003) 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Risk Analysis – Why? 
Along with the rapid progress of industrialization, the risk of incidents (such as 
fire, explosion, and chemical release) is increasing as well. It became increasingly 
recognized that there was a worldwide trend for losses due to accidents to rise more 
rapidly than gross national product (Lees, 1996). The results of a major industrial 
accident can be devastating, such as the Flixborough, England accident, which cost the 
lives of 28 people, the whole plant and many injuries (Crowl & Louvar, 2002); the 
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Bhopal, India accident, which killed more than 2000 civilians and injured 20,000 more 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2002); a massive explosion in Pasadena, Texas on Oct. 23, 1989, 
resulted in 23 fatalities, 314 injuries, and capital loss of over $715 million (Lees, 1996). 
These are extreme cases of major accidents in the process industry, but minor incidents 
are very common in the process industry, occurring on a day to day basis, resulting in 
many occupational injuries, illnesses, and costing the society billions of dollars every 
year. 
Serious accidents receive a great deal of publicity, demanding the industry to 
remedy the situation. The investigation of almost all the major accidents shows that we 
could have avoided those tragedies with an effective risk analysis and safety 
management program. High-quality risk analysis is absolutely necessary for sustainable 
development. There has been growing public awareness and concern regarding the threat 
to people and to the environment from industrial activities, particularly those in which 
the process industry are engaged. This public concern has been translated to some extent 
into federal or state regulations. More than 50 federal regulations are dedicated or 
directly related to chemical process safety (Crowl & Louvar, 2002), among which are 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety 
Management (PSM) standard and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk 
Management Program (RMP). In 1996, the Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation 
Society (ISA) approved ISA-S84.01 (ANSI/ISA-S84.01-1996). The American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted this standard in 1997, which requires that any US 
based instrumented systems developed after March 1997 must meet this standard. 
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Subsequently in 1998, the International Electrotechnical Commission issued IEC 61508 
(IEC 61508, 1998). Safety instrumented systems designed thereafter must abide by this 
regulation with the exception of US installations that must follow ANSI/ISA-S84.01. 
This performance-based standard does not have prescriptive requirements, but it 
provides the overall risk-based safety life cycle model and guidelines for process 
industry to meet a desired safety integrity level (SIL). 
 
1.1.2 Risk Analysis – How? 
A principal theme of risk analysis is to ensure that we know what the hazards are 
before the system is allowed to operate. Risk analysis in the chemical process industry 
(CPI) can either be deterministic or probabilistic. The deterministic methods focus on 
consequence assessment (such as worst-case scenario analysis) while the probabilistic 
approaches consider both frequency and consequence. A variety of techniques have been 
used for risk analysis in the CPI including Safety Review, Checklist Analysis, Relative 
Ranking, “What-if” Analysis, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA), Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) (CCPS, 1992; Lees, 1996). Some of the techniques are more 
appropriate for “broad-brush” screening while others are more adept to detailed analysis. 
Some of techniques require special expertise such as FTA, ETA, CCA, and HRA. Brief 
overviews of each method are presented with their strengths and limitations hereafter 
except for FTA, which will be described in detail in Section 1.3. 
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Safety Review 
Safety Review is probably the first hazard identification technique since the 
dawn of risk analysis. Safety Review involves a thorough and detailed examination of 
process design, plant conditions, operation practices, and maintenance activities in a 
particular facility; and is directed to find critical plant conditions or operating procedures 
that could potentially lead to an incident. It is normally used together with other hazard 
identification techniques such as Checklist Analysis and What-if Analysis.  
Checklist Analysis 
A Checklist Analysis examines a plant using a comprehensive list of questions, 
covering material properties, process design, and operation procedures. It is applicable to 
a project throughout its lifetime, and is often used to verify compliance with standards 
and practices. Checklist Analysis has been extensively used in CPI, and a large number 
of checklists have been published in the literature, a compilation of which can be found 
in Lees, 1996. The completeness of checklists depends on the knowledge of those who 
develop them. Many organizations use standard checklists throughout all stages of a 
project, however, there is often a tendency for them to be left on the shelf (Lees, 1996). 
Checklists are useful only if they are updated and improved regularly.  
Relative Ranking 
Relative Ranking are normally used to compare several design alternatives and 
identify the “best” option in the early stage of process design while opportunities for 
significant changes still exist. However, it can also be performed to an existing process 
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to pinpoint the hazards of various aspects of process operation. A number of hazard 
indices have been developed for different purposes, among which the Dow Fire and 
Explosion Index (F&EI), the Mond Index and the Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss 
(IFAL) Index are the most popular ones. 
The Dow F&EI is the most widely used hazard index. It has gone through seven 
editions since it was first developed by the Dow Chemical Company in 1964. The 
analysis divides a plant into separate process units and assigns indices based on material 
properties, process conditions, areas of exposure, and other damage factors to derive the 
base maximum probable property damage (MPPD). Loss control credits are then applied 
to adjust MPPD to calculate actual MPPD. 
The Mond Index is an extension of the Dow F&EI index. The hazard is assessed 
in a similar way to the Dow F&EI index but introduces additional considerations. Initial 
assessments of fire, explosion and toxicity are carried out for each process unit. 
Offsetting factors for prevention and protection measures are then assigned and 
combined with initial indices. Finally, an overall risk rating is derived from individual 
fire, explosion, and toxicity indices.  
The IFAL index was originally developed for insurance assessment purpose by 
the Insurance Technical Bureau. It requires dividing the plant into blocks, and the 
contribution of each major item of process equipment is determined according to process 
factors, engineering factors, and management factors. Frequency and size of potential 
emissions and chance of ignition are used to determine damage.  
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Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis is required in the MIL-STD-882B System Safety 
Program. It is performed to identify hazards at an early stage of process design using 
resources from design criteria, equipment specifications, material specifications, and 
other sources of information. Preliminary Hazard Analysis is most often conducted in 
the conceptual design or R&D phase of a plant when little or no experience exists to 
predict or identify potential safety problems. It is useful to reduce or eliminate a 
potential hazard from the beginning of process design.  
What-if Analysis 
What-if Analysis is a typical inductive technique. It is probably one of the 
earliest hazard identification techniques. As its name indicates, the What-if Analysis 
requires a group of experienced people to review the plant by seeking to answer a series 
of questions starting with “what if”. There is little publication on What-if Analysis in the 
open literature. It is not inherently structured as other methods and is often used to 
complement a Checklist Analysis, which is called a What-if/Checklist Analysis.  
Hazard and Operability Study 
The HAZOP Study is usually applied when detailed process Piping and 
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) are ready but not yet frozen. It focuses on specific 
points of the process or operation called “study nodes”. The basic concept is to take a 
full description of the process and to question every “study node” to discover what kinds 
of deviations from the intention of the design can occur and their potential causes, 
 
 
 
8
consequences and associated safeguards. This study is exhausted systematically by 
applying appropriate guidewords to each process parameter at each “study node”.  
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a systematic procedure in which each equipment failure mode is 
examined to determine its effects on the system and classify it according to severity and 
criticality. FMEA is an inductive method oriented toward equipment rather than process 
parameters. All of the failure modes for each item of equipment are tabulated with their 
effects, safeguards, and related actions listed. An FMEA is especially useful to identify 
single failure modes that lead to an incident directly, while it is not powerful to identify 
combinations of equipment failure and human errors as risk contributors.  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
An event tree is an inductive reasoning process that starts with an initiating event 
followed by the binary success or failure of subsequent safeguards, human responses, 
and other safety measures to determine its possible outcomes. It is especially suitable to 
find possible outcomes of particular initial events and their respective probabilities with 
the data for initial events and subsequent protections and procedures.  
Cause-Consequence Analysis 
Cause-Consequence Analysis is actually a combination of ETA and FTA. A 
cause-consequence diagram is constructed by defining a critical event and then 
developing the causes and consequences of this event using a fault tree and an event tree, 
respectively. It is a graphical representation of the relationship between the incident 
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outcomes and their primary causes. Although Cause-Consequence Analysis incorporates 
features from FTA and ETA, it is not commonly used since the cause-consequence 
diagram for a fairly simple process is detailed and somewhat cumbersome. It is mostly 
used when the logic model for the concerned event is simple enough for a graphical 
display, which limits its application in the CPI.  
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
HRA is a relatively new area of hazard identification, however, it is getting 
increasing attention nowadays. A typical HRA identifies the factors that will affect the 
performance of operators and the consequences associated with human errors. It 
involves task analyses that consider factors such as job characteristics, personal skill, 
knowledge, and stress level. Although some other techniques like FTA, HAZOP study, 
etc can incorporate some consideration of human errors; a HRA is dedicated to analyze 
human factors in a process systematically. It is usually performed to supplement other 
hazard identification techniques. 
 
1.1.3 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis has been a work of art rather than a science. The evaluation and 
acceptance of risk depend to some extent on the expertise and perception of the analysts. 
On one hand, modern chemical plants have become very complex and highly integrated, 
processing large volumes of materials and operating at extremes of pressure and 
temperature to achieve optimal performance. Advanced information technology ties 
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units together in large complex system with short time constants, allowing little or no 
time for the correction of mistakes or for counteracting effects due to unforeseen 
circumstances. All these factors have made it more difficult to analyze and assess the 
risk associated with a process facility. On the other hand, the development of 
industrialization, the concentration of people, dangerous chemicals, energy, information 
and other values is increasing, which may significantly increase the severities of 
incidents. Hence, there has recently been an increased consciousness both in academia 
and industry to develop advanced risk analysis methodology to predict and reduce risk in 
the process industry. Consequently, the application of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) 
has been widely spreading since being adapted to the particular needs of the process 
industry during the 1980s (Arendt, 1990).  
QRA involves a numerical evaluation of incident consequences and frequencies 
by gathering data and information, and their combination into an overall measure of risk. 
It is actually an analysis strategy instead of a well-defined analysis methodology. QRA 
can be presented in many forms, all of which are trying to answer the following 
questions in a quantitative manner: 
What can go wrong? 
How often will it happen? 
What are the consequences if it happens? 
The very first step of a QRA is hazard identification. Any methods or 
combination of methods described above can be employed to identify existing hazards in 
a system. To answer “how often will it happen?”, we need to calculate the probability of 
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each incident scenario. Historical data, FTA, and Markov Modeling may be applied to 
determine the probability. Historical data are primarily limited to the use of failure data 
of similar systems while FTA is based on the failure rate of components and processes. 
Markov modeling is an advanced technique, which is especially useful when there is a 
dynamic system and time dependent failures. However, many engineers do not feel 
comfortable with Markov modeling and its fundamental mathematical background. A 
variety of source models, dispersion models, and effect models may be used to answer 
“what are the consequences if it happens?”. A more detailed description can be found in 
CCPS, 2000 and Crowl and Louvar, 2002.  
 
1.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
FTA was first developed in 1961 at Bell Telephone Laboratories for missile 
launch control reliability during the Polaris project, and has been extensively used in 
reliability studies in the nuclear and aerospace industry. As a powerful tool for risk 
assessment, FTA has long been adapted for application in the chemical process QRA to 
predict the likelihood of hazardous incidents and identify major risk contributors (CCPS, 
2000). 
 
1.2.1 Fundamentals 
In contrast to ETA, FTA begins with the top event (incident) and continues by 
deductive reasoning through all the intermediate events to primary failures and initiating 
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events. FTA postulates the occurrence of the undesired incidents (termed top event). All 
necessary and sufficient direct causes of the top event are identified and linked to the top 
event using Boolean logic (AND, OR). This procedure continues until system boundary, 
primary failures, human errors, or environmental conditions (termed basic events) are 
reached. This technique is especially powerful to enumerate combinations of equipment 
failures, human errors, and external conditions that will lead to the undesired top event. 
Minimum Cut Sets are the smallest combinations of basic events that will lead to the top 
event. With failure rate data for basic events, probability of the top event can be 
estimated. Figure 1.2 shows the standard symbols used in fault tree representation. 
Figure 1.3 is a sample fault tree for the top event “fire occurs in the storage tank”.  
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Figure 1.2 Standard fault tree symbols 
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 Fire occurs in
the storage tank
 Ignition occurs in
the storage tank
 Sprinkler fire
protection system fails
 Leak externally
at Storage Tank
 Rupture occurs
at Storage Tank
 Erosion occurs
at Storage Tank
 Pre-action
valve failure
 Fusible
link failure
 Human
error
Containment
failures
Ignition sources
available nearby
 
 
Figure 1.3 A sample fault tree for “fire occurs in the storage tank” 
 
 
 
Two principal logic gates, AND and OR, are used in fault tree. Mathematical 
fundamentals behind them are simple and easy to understand. Basic events are assumed 
to be statistically independent unless treated specially. Given this assumption, the 
probability of event A OR event B is calculated as P(A OR B)=P(A)+P(B)-P(A AND 
B), and the probability of event A AND event B is P(A AND B)=P(A)P(B). However, 
this assumption does not restrict FTA from considering dependent failures. Minimum 
Cut Set analysis can detect common cause failures, and a beta factor can be used for 
some dependent failures (Summers, 1998). 
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1.2.2 Fault Tree Construction 
The applications of fault trees have been increasing gradually since fault tree 
technique was invented in the 1960s. However, the construction of fault tree models 
remains an art rather than a science. There is no standard taxonomy for fault tree 
construction. However, some general guidelines have been extracted to assist engineers 
to produce high-quality fault tree models. These rules have been examined and listed in 
the fault tree handbook as ground rules and procedural rules (NUREG-0492, 1998).  
Ground Rule 1: Write the event statements precisely about what the fault is and 
when it occurs. Do not abbreviate words that might lead to 
ambiguous meaning.  
Ground Rule 2: If a specific fault consists of a component failure, classify the 
event as a “state-of-component fault”. Otherwise, classify it as a 
“state-of-system fault”. 
Procedural Rule 1 (No Miracles Rule): If the normal functioning of a component 
propagates a fault sequence, then it is assumed that the 
component functions normally. In other words, it is treated as a 
certain event. If the normal functioning of a component prevents 
the propagation of a fault sequence, AND logic is used to 
consider its failures. 
Procedural Rule 2 (Complete-the-Gate Rule): All inputs to a particular 
intermediate gate should be completely defined before further 
analysis of any one of them is undertaken. Each child must be 
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an immediate and direct cause of its parent. Each child must be 
either sufficient in case of an OR gate and necessary in case of 
an AND gate. 
Procedural Rule 3 (No Gate-to-Gate Rule): All gate inputs should be properly 
defined, and no gate should directly feed into another gate. 
 
1.2.3 Strengths and Limitations 
The strengths of FTA are straightforward. FTA explicitly expresses how 
equipment failures, operator errors, and external factors lead to system failures in a 
graphical representation that is easy to understand. It identifies major risk contributors 
and combinations of primary failures and human errors that lead to an undesirable 
incident. In particular, it quantifies benefits associated with process safe guards and 
compares risk-reduction measures quantitatively in terms of safety. It is a structured 
methodology and well documented, ready to modify according to system changes.  
However, despite all its advantages, there are some limitations in its application 
that needs to be mentioned. FTA is a “snap shot” of the system, and a component in a 
fault tree is categorized into two states: working or fail. Intermediate states or partial 
failures are not considered, thus it is not suitable for dynamic analysis. 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem 
FTA is one of the best tools available for a comprehensive reliability study. 
Much can be gained by the application of FTA in the CPI. Unfortunately, the current 
application of FTA in the CPI is somehow limited (Andrew, 1980). Then what is the 
enemy within? 
One major barrier with regard to its application in the CPI is fault tree 
construction. Processes, materials, equipment, and control mechanisms are much more 
diverse in the CPI than in the nuclear industry. The method does not itself assure that all 
failure modes have been considered. It requires specially trained and skilled practitioners 
who are familiar with the methodology and understand the process under analysis to 
ensure the completeness and correctness of the analysis. Fault trees for a reasonably 
complicated process will be enormous and needs overwhelming expert time, sometimes 
measured in years, to complete. Due to the human labor and time required, the cost is 
relatively high compared to other methodology. Subjective factors are extensively 
involved in fault tree construction. Fault trees developed by different individuals for the 
same process are usually different in structure, and may thus lead to different results.  
In order to calculate the probability or failure distribution of top events, 
probabilities or failure distributions of all basic events are required. Dearth of failure rate 
data and the large uncertainty associated with the data is a considerable problem in the 
application of FTA. With data collection and exchange efforts from both the government 
agencies and industry, this problem is slowly being ameliorated.  
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While there are well-developed commercialized software packages for fault tree 
evaluation, no satisfactory methodology has been published for fault tree synthesis, 
especially when control loops are encountered. The availability of a computer-based 
analysis methodology that simplifies the system understanding process and takes a 
structured approach to develop fault trees would greatly increase the attractiveness of 
FTA techniques in the CPI.  
 
1.4 Objectives 
From the above description, it is apparent that fault tree construction is one major 
barrier with regard to its application in the CPI. To overcome this difficulty, a 
computerizable fault tree synthesis methodology is developed in this research. The basic 
idea is to capture the cause-and-effect logic between equipment behaviors, human 
responses, and environment factors around each item of equipment directly into mini 
fault trees. Special fault trees are developed to model the behaviors of special features 
such as control loops, trip systems, and bypasses.  
The objectives of this research include: 
• Development of fault propagation model for components 
• Development of cause-and-effect model for special features in the CPI 
• Development of a computerizable fault tree synthesis methodology 
• Design of database structure to be used in this methodology 
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• Validation of the methodology by comparing the results with published 
examples 
Prototype computer codes will be programmed to demonstrate the correctness 
and applicability of this methodology using published examples in the literature.  
The ultimate goal of this research is to standardize quantitative risk analyses 
through a computer package and guide decision makers toward more formal and more 
cost-effective solutions for the allocation of resources to prevent incident and reduce 
risk. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation introduces a framework to model fault propagation in process 
plants and develops a structured computerizable fault tree synthesis methodology for 
QRA in the CPI.  
Chapter I introduces a broad overview of the importance of risk analysis and 
current practices in the process industry. The second part of Chapter I explains the 
fundamental, pros and cons of fault tree techniques. The difficulties faced in its 
application in the CPI are discussed followed by objectives of this work. Chapter II 
presents a detailed literature review of current research status of computer-aided fault 
tree synthesis. Preliminary work in this area has been categorized as digraph-based 
methods, mini fault tree based methods, rule based methods, loop based methods, and 
other methods based on the fundamental modeling techniques that have been used. 
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Applicability and limitations of each method have been discussed respectively. A 
description of the overall methodology is provided in Chapter III in detail, as well as the 
fault propagation model. Top event identification, mini fault tree generation, fault tree 
generation, tree rationalization, and tree simplification are discussed subsequently. The 
discussion of fault propagation model is divided into two parts. The first part is 
dedicated to component modeling while the second one focuses on special feature 
modeling. Database structure is presented in Chapter IV that has been used to represent 
component modeling and special feature modeling in the demonstration computer codes. 
The public database and the specific database are discussed respectively. Chapter V 
describes the interface and flow charts of the demonstration program. Algorithms of 
major functions are presented with diagrams. Chapter VI discusses two case studies. One 
is related to fire event identification and the other one is a cooling-down process of hot 
nitric acid. Results are compared and validated with published fault trees. Chapter VII 
addresses data uncertainty problems in risk analysis and proposes a practical and 
efficient procedure to deal with data uncertainty in determining Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL) for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and identify the inputs that may eventually 
lead to a change in the estimation of SIL.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Overview 
While commercialized computer codes are available for the evaluation of fault 
trees, the synthesis of fault trees is a barrier with regard to its application in the process 
industry. Fault trees are generated manually in most cases. Although general guidelines 
are available for fault tree synthesis, learning how to create fault tress is akin to learning 
to ski: some people never quite make it (Evans, 1981).  
The great diversity of equipment, hazardous materials, chemical processes, and 
control mechanisms in the CPI has made the task of generating fault tree models 
difficult. Subjective factors are involved extensively in the manual construction of fault 
trees, and different analysts will almost certainly generate different fault tree models for 
the same processes. Conventional manual construction of fault trees is a difficult and 
time-consuming task, which requires trained analysts who understand the methodology 
and the system under study as well. For instances, fault trees in the Wash 1400 report 
have taken many man years to complete. On the other hand, industrial development, 
public awareness, and more rigorous regulation are demanding manufacturers to prove 
that they have identified major existing hazards and adopt appropriate and adequate 
prevention and protection measures. As a result, many researchers have been working on 
computerized fault tree synthesis during the past two decades, and a variety of methods 
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have been published. The state of research work on computer assisted fault tree 
construction has been reviewed and presented (Allen & Rao, 1980; Carpignano & 
Poucet, 1994.) 
 
2.2 Preliminary Research 
2.2.1 Digraph Based Methods 
A digraph (directed graphs) is a graphical representation that explicitly describes 
the cause-and-effect relationship within and among equipment, processes, human 
interactions, and environment in a chemical plant. It consists of nodes and arcs labeled 
with a signed numerical value. A node represents a process variable, human interaction, 
an environment event, or a specific fault, and an arc indicates the influence of the first 
node on the second one. A number is assigned depending on the relative direction and 
magnitude of the deviation of the second variable related to the first. This number 
essentially indicates a qualitative relationship between process variables. A moderate 
deviation is represented by “1” while a large deviation is reflected by “10”. If a deviation 
of the first variable results in a deviation of the second variable in the same direction, the 
sign of the number is positive, otherwise, it is negative.  
Lapp and Powers (1977, 1979) proposed their well-known algorithm based on 
digraphs. In their work, the modeling of a single component requires the identification of 
all process variables that are transferred through it and their relative gains. A digraph 
model is manually created for the system under consideration. Loops, particularly 
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feedback and feedforward loops, are managed by introducing subtrees (called operators) 
whenever nodes on a loop are encountered. These operators have been refined further by 
Andrews and Brennan (1990), Lambert (1979), and Chang and Hwang (1992). Given the 
system digraph and a list of the feedback and feedforward loops, it is possible to 
construct fault trees. To address the problem of identifying all the loops in a digraph 
model, Chang et al. (1997) proposed a loop identification and classification algorithm 
for this methodology, which has yet to be tested against realistic processes. However, 
manual construction of system digraphs is tedious and laborious. Creating a satisfactory 
digraph representation of the system under study requires an effort equivalent to or 
sometimes greater than the effort required for developing fault tree models itself. No 
algorithm has been published for the automation of digraph generation for a chemical 
process. This impacts the significance of digraph-based algorithms. In addition, the 
digraph model for a chemical process is not unique in the sense that the analyst will have 
different taste regarding failure modes and effects of the components within a chemical 
process and the interaction among them. In particular, this methodology works based on 
a node-by-node algorithm. Nodes especially on any loops are treated numerous times. 
This is not only a waste of the computation time but also results in many repeated events 
which compromise the readability of the generated fault trees.  
Kuo et al. (1997; 1998) developed prototype software called “IHAS (Integrated 
Hazard Analysis System)”. FTA, ETA, and HAZOP Study can be performed with 
component digraphs, which are connected according to the P&ID automatically to obtain 
the system digraph. This system digraph is then utilized to locate loops and construct 
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fault trees. This algorithm is essentially based on Lapp & Powers’ work (Lapp & 
Powers, 1977). However, the digraph models of a component are context dependent 
(Carpignano & Poucet, 1994). They depend not only on the equipment itself but also on 
the particular process within which it is used.  
Powers and Tompkins (1974) suggested generating fault trees from input/output 
models of components. These models incorporate the functional relationship between 
inputs and outputs of equipment. The effects of equipment failures have been taken into 
account as well. However, this approach has not yet been developed to be applicable to 
complex processes.  
Bossche (1991a; 1991b) used the “relations” between process variables and 
component states to model fault propagation in the process industry. These “relations” 
are essentially similar to digraph. Signed numbers called “propagation factors” are used 
to indicate the magnitude and direction of influences between process variables. 
Component states and conditional variables are attached to each relation pattern. An 
intermediate causal tree is utilized first to model bi-directional flow and fault 
propagation, and then this causal tree is adjusted according to feedback and feedforward 
controls. Final fault trees are extracted from the intermediate causal tree. This 
methodology has been adapted for real-time fault diagnosis in the chemical process, 
whose capability is yet to be proved (Kocza & Bossche, 1997).  
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2.2.2 Mini Fault Tree Based Methods 
Fussell (1973) developed a formal fault tree synthesis methodology for electrical 
systems, from which failure transfer functions were used to model failure modes. In his 
synthesis tree model, the system-independent component failure transfer functions were 
utilized together with the system schematic diagram and associated system boundary 
conditions to construct fault trees. This methodology has been applied to simple 
electrical systems. Though claimed in his paper that the method extends to all fault tree 
construction beyond the area of electrical systems, problems arise in the preparation of 
failure transfer functions and fault events. 
Fussell’s algorithm was later modified and improved by Taylor to manage loops 
in the system (Taylor, 1982). For each item of equipment, a set of functional and failure 
modes is defined, equations are written that describe component performance under 
functional and failure states, which is reflected by equation bigraphs. Fault propagation 
between the components is indicated by the arrows between the bigraphs, from which a 
cause-and-effect graph is generated. Equation bigraphs together with the cause-and-
effect graph are then used to draw signal flow graph. Bigraphs, signal flow graphs, and 
state transition tables are converted to decision tables. Instead of being just logical, the 
decision tables represent the qualitative gains between the input and output variables 
within a component. The decision tables are then translated into mini-trees stored in a 
component library. Similar to the idea suggested in the digraph methodology, special 
models are applied when control loops are encountered. This fault tree construction is on 
a component-by-component basis, which is a major advantage over the node-by-node 
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methodology. However, the generation of component models is a procedure of eleven 
major steps, which involves the development of equations for all functional and failure 
states, equation bigraphs, cause-and-effect graphs, signal flow graphs, input/output event 
table, state transition tables, decision tables, and a mini fault tree library, which restricts 
the methodology from any realistic application. 
Poucet (1990) developed an interactive computer program, which requires 
extensive computer and user information exchange. This method requires modular 
component models and transfer logic models. This algorithm is a two-step procedure: A 
“skeleton” fault tree is built first, and then expanded to incorporate component models. 
Modular component models are stored in a permanent database and are used to give a 
general description of the functionalities of components and the component failure 
modes and their effects. Transfer logic models, similar to decision tables, are used to 
trace fault propagation from one component to another according to the P&IDs. Transfer 
logic models contain the physical and behavioral descriptions of components in their 
various functioning or failure modes, expressed as logical expressions. As acknowledged 
by the authors, users have to intervene in the construction process to avoid the process 
going to irrelevant branches. Further work has not been seen to remedy this problem.  
A series of papers have been published by Hunt et al. based on componentistic 
mini-fault tree models (Kelly & Lees; 1985a; 1985b; 1985c; Hunt et al., 1993a; 1993b; 
1993c; 1993d; 1993e). A large system is decomposed into items of equipment, where 
streams flowing in and out are assigned as dummy heat and tail units. Fault tree 
synthesis process is performed by tracing the fault propagation from one mini fault tree 
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to another. Their mini-fault trees are generated from propagation equations, event 
statements, and decision tables. A propagation equation reflects qualitative relationship 
between inputs and outputs of equipment under normal and fail conditions. Event 
statements record the effects of all the failure modes and external conditions within a 
component. Decision tables are employed to indicate conditional changes of relationship 
among process variables. Mini-trees are also used for special functional and structural 
situations such as headers and dividers, process controls, and trip loops. The 
methodology was developed originally for continuous processes, and it is ready to be 
adapted to embrace batch or sequential processes such as startup and shutdown 
operations. Reverse flow and two-way propagation have been considered. Since mini-
fault trees are more suitable for an automatic framework, this methodology includes top 
event model library, unit model library, and mini fault tree library. The requirements for 
storage and computational complexity are much higher compared to other methods. 
Although the method promises a reasonable level of automation, no help is provided for 
the component modeling and the recognition of system functionalities and structures, 
which remain the responsibility of the analysts. No further publication has appeared on 
this work subsequently since 1993. 
 
2.2.3 Rule Based Methods 
Elliott (1994) presented a knowledge-based approach to build a fault tree from a 
reliability block diagram. User interactions were required to input the knowledge-based 
if/then rules, and the rule interpreter was used to execute fault tree construction rules. 
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This methodology attempts to incorporate features of artificial intelligence. A fault tree 
reduction algorithm has been considered to minimize the size of fault trees, but the 
substantial work to create if/then rules is left to the user. In addition, how to handle 
control loops is not clear in this methodology.  
 
2.2.4 Loop Based Methods 
Shafaghi et al. (1984a, 1984b) proposed a systematic approach to construct fault 
trees by decomposing the plant into a set of control loops. Instead of decomposing a 
chemical plant into functional units like most other methods, they sought to divide it 
according to control loops. In their method digraphs were created manually for each 
control loop and for the plant as a whole. Control loops are treated as the skeleton of the 
plant. The interconnection and fault propagation among loops were used to construct 
intermediate trees and then combined with component digraphs to generate the final 
fault trees. As mentioned above, digraph models for the whole system and each control 
loop must be created manually, which remain unsolved. Moreover, interaction and fault 
propagation between control loops are modeled by connection tables between control 
loops. For some cases such as reactors and distillation columns, control loops are 
coupled together, and the connections between them are not necessarily clear and 
obvious. Equipment with coupled process controls is almost always critical in safety 
studies. The connection tables for those items of equipment could be difficult to generate 
and suspect of human omissions.  
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Another similar algorithm was later proposed by Chang and Yuan (Chang & 
Yuan, 2000). It seeks to modularize each control loop first to establish its unit model and 
then to construct fault trees from a reduced system that is constituent of control loops. 
This method is essentially similar to the Shafaghi et al. (1984a, 1984b)’s method. The 
drawbacks mentioned above for control loop based methods still remain unsolved. 
 
2.2.5 Other Methods 
Caceres and Henley (1976) proposed an algorithm to create fault trees from a 
process block diagram. However, this methodology is unable to manage feedforward 
loops, which reduces its value to the CPI.  
Camarda et al. (1978) proposed an efficient simple algorithm for fault tree 
synthesis from reliability graphs. In their method, reliability graphs were employed to 
identify all the minimal path sets and then transformed into equivalent fault trees. 
Reliability graph is itself a tool to identify hazards. Development of reliability graph is 
not necessarily obvious and straightforward, especially for complex chemical processes.  
De Vries (1990) developed a quantitative methodology to generate fault trees 
from a schematic diagram applicable only to electrical circuits. 
Another fault tree construction methodology was presented by Kumamoto and 
Henley (1995). A terminology of “flow” was introduced to indicate any material, 
information, energy, activity, or phenomenon that can propagate through the system. 
Three values: flow rate, generation rate, and aperture are used to characterize each 
“flow”. Equipment is categorized according to these three attributes, and fragmented 
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semantic networks are developed for each type of equipment. A semantic network for 
the whole system is then produced from these fragments together with a system 
schematic. Fault tree generation is guided by recursive event development rules, which 
are generated from flow rate, generation rate, and aperture attributes. This method 
appears to be more advantageous than digraph based method in the sense that it can 
indicate relations other than digraph gains among process variables, equipment failures, 
human activities, and environmental conditions. However, equipment behavior, 
component interaction, and fault propagation are defined based on “flow” and its three 
attributes. Problems arise in the preparation and understanding of these flows and their 
attributes. Treatment of process control loops is not yet stated explicitly in this work.  
 
2.3 Summary of Chapter II 
A comprehensive review of the research work done on computer assisted fault 
tree synthesis has been presented in this chapter. Efforts have been carried out to 
overcome the problem of traditional manual construction of fault trees to facilitate the 
application of fault tree technique in the CPI. However, none of the above methods has 
yet been extensively used in practice. Strengths and limitations of each method have 
been discussed. Some methods are valid only for electrical systems, some are not 
applicable to complex systems, and many involve generation of a complicated system 
model, such as digraphs, decision tables, transition tables, and connection tables between 
control loops, which is equivalent to or sometimes even more substantial than generating 
fault tree models itself. In particular, fault tree logic to model the behavior of process 
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loops and control loops are one of the most challenging parts and have been the subject 
of many literature debates for years. No entirely satisfactory algorithm has been 
published for fault tree synthesis, especially when control loops are encountered.  
This research is aimed at developing a practical and efficient computer-aided 
fault tree synthesis methodology. Cause-and-effect models are generated automatically 
by the program from functional digraph tables, failure modes and effects tables and 
external events tables. Special features such as process controls, trip systems, bypasses, 
pressure relief systems, etc. are handled through special cause-and-effect models. This 
methodology works directly from process P&IDs, thus it avoid the tedious working of 
generating a complicated system modeling. The tree structure is expected to be concise 
and easy to understand. Details of this proposed methodology are presented in Chapter 
III.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY* 
 
3.1 Overview 
The basic idea of the proposed methodology is to capture the cause-and-effect 
logic among equipment behaviors, human responses, and environment factors around 
each item of equipment directly into mini fault trees. Mini fault trees are employed to 
model the local cause and effect relationship of components. Special fault trees are 
developed to model the behaviors of special features such as control loops, trip systems, 
pressure relief systems, and bypasses. This methodology starts directly from a process 
block diagram, and fault trees created by this method are expected to be concise and 
easy to understand. 
In order to computerize the entire procedure, the block diagram has to be read to 
represent the system topology. Configuration information, initiating states, and physical 
boundaries are embedded in the system block diagram.  
 
*Part of this chapter is reprinted from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, Vol. 15, No. 4, Wang Y., T.L. Teague, H.H. West, & M.S. Mannan, A New 
Algorithm for Computer-Aided Fault Tree Synthesis, 265-277, Copyright (2002), with 
permission from Elsevier. 
*Part of this chapter is reprinted from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, Vol. 16, No 5, Wang Y., W.J. Rogers, H.H. West, & M.S. Mannan, 
Algorithmic Fault Tree Synthesis for Control Loops, 427-441, Copyright (2003), with 
permission from Elsevier. 
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Once the top events have been selected, the algorithm proceeds to find the 
corresponding cause-and-effect models in the top event library to trace the top event 
down to deviations in the process variables, or prompt for user interaction if it does not 
exist in the library. Then intermediate events are developed, and relevant cause-and-
effect models are generated directly from the digraphs, failure mode table, and external 
event table until a system boundary or primary events are reached. Control loops and 
special features are managed by their corresponding fault tree models (template trees), 
which will be addressed in detail later. Serial consistency is ensured during fault tree 
synthesis procedure, and parallel consistency is checked after the initial tree is 
constructed. After that, a simplification procedure is performed to make the fault tree 
concise and easy to read. Finally, user verification is required to ensure the completeness 
and correctness of the final fault tree. 
Figure 3.1 is a simplified flow chart of the fault tree synthesis methodology, of 
which some steps are addressed in detail in the following sections and Chapter IV and 
Chapter V.  
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Figure 3.1 A simplified flow chart of the fault tree synthesis methodology 
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3.2 Top Event 
A top event is defined as an undesirable event or incident. The first step of FTA 
is to identify the potential top events. This is normally achieved by hazard identification 
analysis. The identification of top events is critical but often underestimated. 
Undesirable incidents can be categorized into three classes as human impacts, 
environmental impacts, and economic impacts (CCPS, 1989). Typical top events include 
fires, explosions, toxic materials, human injury, environment contamination, property 
damage, poor product yield/quality, legal liability, etc. It is difficult to automate top 
event identification. In this work, simple checklists are employed to assist analysts to 
identify potential incidents. However, this approach is not exhaustive and does not 
represent complete hazard identification. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure its 
completeness and correctness. Users can also specify their perceived incidents directly. 
Checklists and corresponding fault tree models for fire, explosion, and toxic 
releases have been developed in this project. For instance, the basic idea in fire event 
identification is to examine every possible location for the presence of fuel, oxygen, and 
ignition sources. If the area is not classified as intrinsically safe, users can select possible 
ignition sources in a particular facility from a list of typical ignition sources in the 
chemical process industry, or add perceived ignition sources manually. If the area is 
classified as intrinsically safe, then ignition sources are normally related to maintenance 
activities and operation procedures that might render the area not intrinsically safe. For 
intrinsically safe areas, users are responsible to enter possible ignition sources. Figure 
3.2 is a sample checklist for fire event identification in this algorithm.  
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1. Are there any flammable/combustible
materials?
2. Area: Where do the flammable/
combustible materials exist?
5. Protection: Is there any protection
 not on P&ID?
4. Ignition Source: Is the area
classified as intrinsic safe?
3. Inventory: Are they enough to
 self sustain a fire if ignited?
6. How can this fail?
Any more protection?
7. Containment Failure: How can the flammable/
combustible material expose to oxygen?
Any more flammable/
combustible materials?
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Stop
What is the potential ignition sources?
 
 
Figure 3.2 A sample checklist for “fire” event 
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This checklist can run repeatedly for any flammable/combustible materials that 
might be present. The answer to all the questions are simply yes/no or in AND/OR 
format. The corresponding resultant fault tree model for a fire event is shown in Figure 
3.3. Ignition sources for intrinsically safe areas and not intrinsically safe areas are 
different. Users may revise the fault tree models for top event generated from checklists. 
 
 
 
Fire occurs
Fire occurs at location 1 and
protection fails
Answer to Problem 6 Answer to Problem 6
Answer to Problem 7
Fire occurs at location 1
Protection 1 at location 1 fails
Fire occurs at location n and
protection fails
Protection n at location 1 fails
Answer to Problem 6 Answer to Problem 6
Fire occurs at location n
Protection 1 at location n fails Protection n at location n fails
Ignition Sources at
Location 1
Ignition Sources Containment Failureat Location 1
Answer to Problem 7Ignition Sources atLocation n
Ignition Sources Containment Failureat Location 1
 
 
Figure 3.3 The resultant fault tree model for ‘fire” event 
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3.3 Modeling Component 
Chemical plants are usually very large and complex, and it is impractical and 
unnecessary to analyze the entire plant at one time. To gain a reasonable scope of study, 
the first task is to divide the plant into a set of functional units and then examine them 
one by one. Therefore, before applying the methodology, the physical boundary of the 
system must be well defined. 
The information that must be gathered for good reliability analysis includes 
component interrelations, component failure characteristics, and accurate system 
specifications. In order to automate fault tree synthesis, the computer must identify the 
system components and their connections. In this work, a system block diagram is used 
to represent the system topology. Each block in a system block diagram represents one 
item of equipment. A solid line between components indicates the physical connection 
between them, and a dotted line represents information or signal transmission between 
components (typically in control loops, trip systems, and alarm systems). The 
configuration information for controls or special features is also required for a block 
diagram. 
However, there is still one problem remaining to address. The behavior of each 
component in a chemical plant depends on time, internal states, and external 
environment. Each component in a system is related to other components (materials, 
equipment, plant personnel, etc.) and environment in a specific manner and identical 
components may behave differently in different environment. Before we can determine 
the correct cause-and-effect models to apply, the component state and environment 
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factors must be clarified, which will be incorporated into a system block diagram. 
System identification requires a detailed description of component initial states and 
normal operation conditions. Initial conditions are specified for each component that has 
more than one operating states. The external event table records the external events and 
its effects associated with each plant, section, unit operation, and equipment. The lower 
level components inherit external events automatically from the upper level blocks. 
As we have noticed, some failure behaviors of components are time-related. 
Furthermore, fault trees are instant “snapshots” of a system at a certain time. Start-up or 
shutdown conditions can generate different hazards compared to a steady state operation, 
and the time domain must also be specified.  
In summary, system identification requires a careful delineation of component 
initial conditions. The time domain must also be specified; start-up or shutdown 
conditions can generate different hazards than a steady state operation. Once the system 
is defined clearly, we can then proceed with fault tree construction. 
 
3.3.1 Fault Propagation within Component 
Each chemical plant is unique, however, they have much identical equipment, 
materials, and even processes. For these common components, we have sufficient 
knowledge of their failure modes and effects. If we can utilize this common knowledge 
and automate this part, the labor and cost required in fault tree construction will be 
reduced significantly. 
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Qualitative cause-and-effect models are used to represent the functionality and 
relationship within components. The mini fault tree models for an individual component 
include three parts: 1. partial (simple) digraphs describing the first-principle relationship 
between the input and output variables; 2. failure modes and their effects; 3. external 
events and their effects. Digraphs are generated from qualitative confluences and 
heuristic knowledge of the equipment. The effect of a failure, human error, and 
environmental condition can cause one/several output deviations or change the 
relationships among variables. Failure modes and external events are integrated into 
cause-and-effect models directly during the fault tree synthesis to avoid unnecessary 
expanding of the digraph. The lower level components inherit external events 
automatically from the upper level blocks.  
When constructing the fault tree, the algorithm searches for the appropriate 
digraphs, relevant failure modes, and external events of the current output variable 
deviations, generates mini-fault tree models automatically and then utilizes them to 
construct fault trees. Because of this approach, we not only reduce the storage 
requirement, the models are also straightforward and easy to understand. Users can edit 
the relationships among the variables, and add possible failure modes for the specific 
equipment directly in the database. 
Digraphs in this algorithm are only partial digraphs showing the general 
functionality of a component between input and output under certain states. There are no 
published systematic guidelines for the generation of digraphs. An algorithm creating 
diagraphs directed from differential equations and algebraic equations was mentioned in 
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Maurya, Rengaswamy, and Venkatsubramanian (2001), which is yet to be detailed and 
proved. For most of the equipment, chemical processes, and unit operations in the CPI, 
many theoretical or empirical mathematical models have been developed to describe 
their behavior. These mathematical models typically involve fluid mechanics, mass 
transfer, heat transfer, and kinetics. However, in most cases, it is difficult, expensive, 
and sometimes impractical to solve the large set of all the unwieldy mathematical 
equations and present an accurate quantitative analysis even with the help of modern 
computers. Fortunately, it is not always necessary to solve the equations numerically to 
construct a digraph for a device or a process. In contrast to classical physics, qualitative 
physics describes physical systems in qualitative terms – qualitative states and 
qualitative differential equations (De Kleer & Brown, 1984). The concepts and theories 
of qualitative physics are not yet mature, but it is still useful to create digraphs 
systematically for relatively simple devices. Once input variables and output variables 
are specified, qualitative differential equations are drawn from the conventional 
mathematical models, and digraphs are derived from these equations. For heterogeneous 
and distributed system such as heat exchangers and distillation columns, mathematical 
equations, experimental data or heuristic knowledge can be used together to create the 
digraphs. 
External event table includes the environmental conditions and external activities 
that will cause deviation or change the relationship between any input and output 
variables in the process under study. 
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Examples of digraph, failure modes and effects table, and external event table 
can be found in the case studies presented in Chapter V.  
 
3.3.2 Fault Propagation between Component 
An essential aspect of fault tree construction is tracing concerned process 
deviations, taking care of process safe guards in the meanwhile. In order to generate 
correct fault tree models, component interrelations and system topology, component 
failure characteristics, and accurate system specifications must be provided.  
A system consists of components such as hardware, materials, and plant 
personnel, and is surrounded by its physical and social environment, and suffers from 
aging. The functionality of a component can be affected from within the component such 
as equipment failures or from outside factors such as the states of connected components. 
Deviations are assumed to initiate through components, and the environment, plant 
personnel, and aging can affect the system only through the system components.  
Each component in a system is related to the other components in a specific 
manner, and identical components may have different characteristics in different 
systems. Therefore, we must clarify component interrelations and system topology. The 
interrelations and topology are found by examining plant piping, electrical wiring, 
mechanical couplings, information flows, alarm loops, and physical locations of 
components, which are represented by system block diagram in this methodology. Fault 
propagation among components are taken into account by tracing physical connections 
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in system block diagram and examining the specific inputs to determine if the changes of 
these input can change the component state.  
The system environment enters the cause and effect models by external event 
tables. The same external event may cause multiple equipment failures or process 
deviations. The system boundary must be provided to prevent the analysis from 
diverging. Fault propagation at the system boundary is treated as a basic event, and is not 
developed further. However, this basic event might be top events for the adjacent system 
units.  
A condition or an event that causes multiple basic events is called a common 
cause. An example of a common cause is an external fire or flood that causes all 
supposedly redundant components to fail simultaneously. Common mode failures are 
always an important subject of FTA. Consider one system consisting of valves A and B, 
and assume that one of the valves is redundant. This valve system will be far more 
reliable than a system with a single valve, if one valve fails independently of the other. 
Coexistence of the two malfunctions is unlikely. However, if one valve is liable to fail 
under the same conditions as the other, the double-valve system is only slightly more 
reliable than the single-valve system. In this methodology, each basic event is tagged 
with a unique identifier. Common cause failures can be found during fault tree 
evaluation if some basic events cause more than one failure or deviation, and feed into 
multiple intermediate events.  
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3.4  Modeling Special Features 
Special features such as process controls, trip systems, bypasses, pressure relief 
etc. are integral parts of the design and operation of a safe and productive chemical 
plant. How to handle special features is the central concern in the research of computer-
aided fault tree synthesis for the CPI. Different types of control systems have different 
failure mechanisms and therefore different cause-and-effect models. Every special 
feature within the process under analysis needs to be identified and classified according 
to its structural characteristics and functionalities. Although it is highly desirable to 
automate the identification and classification of special features, it has been recognized 
that a mechanistic approach is not realistic and not always appropriate. In this work, 
control loops and their configurations are supplied as part of the system block diagram. 
 
3.4.1 Modeling Process Controls 
There are three circumstances under which a controlled process variable can 
deviate beyond its normal range (Lapp & Powers, 1977). Firstly, uncontrollable 
disturbances can drive the controlled variable to abnormal states even when the control 
loop is working properly. Secondly, a deviation can be caused by a controllable 
disturbance while the control loop is inactive. Finally, the control loop itself can cause 
process deviations upon certain malfunctions.  
Based on the above thoughts, modeling of process control loops includes three 
essential attributes: constituent components, control capability (uncontrollable or 
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controllable), and instrumental failure effects (inactive or unhealthy). A generalized fault 
tree model for process controls is proposed, which is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
Deviation of
controlled variable
Uncontrollable disturbances Control unhealthyControllable disturbancesand control inactive
Controllable disturbanceControl inactive
 
 
Figure 3.4 A generalized fault tree model for process controls 
 
 
 
Uncontrollable disturbances refer to disturbances that are not captured by the 
control loop such as set point too high, large/fast disturbances in feedback controls, and 
uncompensated disturbances in feedforward controls. These disturbances will cause the 
controlled variable to deviate from the normal range regardless of the status of the 
control loop. When the control loop is inactive, such as a stuck component, the 
controlled variable will deviate upon a disturbance. When the control loop is unhealthy, 
the controlled variable will deviate even without disturbance. “Unhealthy” conditions are 
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rendered by component malfunctions (fails high/low) or component reverse installation. 
Four most common types of instrument failures are considered in this work: “stuck”, 
“zero point drift high/low”, “fails high/low”, and “reversed”. The “reversed” faults of 
continuous control loops normally should be detected during the design, installation, or 
test phases. If other instrumental failures are possible, the user can add them manually 
by specifying the effects of these failures (control inactive or control unhealthy). Here 
we assume that the possibility of “two elements on the control loop malfunctioning 
simultaneously” is negligible, which is normally true in reality. 
Feedback control, feedforward control, nested control, and flow ratio control are 
typically used in the CPI, of which negative feedback control and negative feedforward 
control are the most popular. Different types of control systems behave differently with 
regard to the same disturbance and have different tolerances toward certain instrument 
failures, and hence their cause-and-effect models. Therefore, each type of control 
mechanism has its own cause-and-effect fault tree model, which has three subtrees for 
“uncontrollable disturbances”, “controllable disturbances and control loop inactive”, and 
“control loop causes the deviation” events. Computer control, alarm system, and manual 
control systems can be viewed as special forms of feedback or feedforward systems. The 
instruments discussed here are not limited to traditional sensors, controllers, and control 
valves. Computers, human operators, digital devices, and logic voting systems can 
represent any of them and differ only in their failure mechanisms and failure rates. For 
instance, when evaluating conventional controllers, we normally consider hardware 
failures. However, there is a significant amount of human involvement in the design, 
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operation, and maintenance of computer and manual controls, which experiences both 
software and hardware failure. Therefore we must take human activity into account 
when gathering data for computer controls and manual controls. A logical voting system 
is typically used for the purpose of redundancy, and mathematical treatment can be 
employed to derive its failure rate. Trip system, bypass, and overpressure relief can be 
viewed as special forms of feedforward loop. The treatments of these special features are 
slightly different from normal feedforward controls. Complex control systems such as 
cascade and ratio controls are dealt as a whole with their corresponding fault tree 
models. 
Even for the same control scheme, the cause-and-effect model may differ with 
the controller type. Traditionally, controllers can be proportional (P), proportional-
integral (PI), proportional-derivative (PD), and proportional-integral-derivative (PID). 
The integral function reduces the steady-state errors to zero and is also called “reset” 
action while the derivative function was proposed to speed up the action of the control 
loop and is also called “rate” action. There is no systematic discussion about the effects 
of various types of controllers on the fault tree synthesis. Galluzzo and Andow (1984) 
once reported some experimental work about the effect of proportional and proportional-
and-integral controllers on fault tree synthesis. The special fault tree models for control 
loops must be modified especially when the controller has the integral function, which is 
quite common in the CPI. The effects of different conventional controllers on the fault 
tree synthesis will be discussed as well. 
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When control loops are encountered in fault tree synthesis, we are normally 
concerned with the deviations of the controlled variables instead of the intermediate 
outputs of sensors, controllers, and control valves. Therefore, in this research, only 
models for deviations of the controlled process variables are developed. Furthermore, 
most control loops prevent the controlled variable from deviating in both directions 
(positive and negative). The cause-and-effect models for negative deviations of the 
controlled variable are similar to those for positive deviations except for the case of uni-
direction control loops. Though not discussed specifically in this dissertation, this 
methodology is ready to embrace uni-direction control loops through capability tables. 
The figures in the following section represent the proposed cause-and-effect unit models 
of a medium positive deviation of the controlled variable. An extension to a negative or 
large deviation is straightforward. In this dissertation, feedback controls, feedforward 
controls, nested controls, and ratio controls are discussed in detail. Trip systems, 
bypasses, and pressure relief are viewed as special forms of feedforward or feedback 
control. Complex controls can be handled by providing their corresponding fault tree 
models. 
 
3.4.2 Modeling Feedback Loops 
Feedback is the most popular control mechanism in the CPI. It is simple and easy 
to design, implement, and test. In particular, it can tolerate slow changes of controllers 
and control valves, such as zero point drifting failures. Figure 3.5 is a general block 
diagram of feedback controls. As denoted, sensor, controller, and control element here 
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are not limited to traditional instruments, and can represent any kind of transmitter, 
programmable logic solver, and final action element.  
 
 
 
Set point
Sensor
ProcessControlelementController
Disturbances
+
-
+
+
Controlled variable
 
 
Figure 3.5 Feedback control block diagram 
 
 
 
In contrast to feedforward control, feedback control is capable of capturing most 
of the process disturbances to the controlled variable except for set point deviations, but 
it may be saturated by large disturbances or ineffective for fast disturbances. Therefore, 
“uncontrollable disturbances” include large and fast disturbances and set point 
deviations. Feedback control is robust toward slow changes of controller and control 
valve, and only sensor zero point drifting and complete instrument failures (“fails 
high/low”) can render the control loop “unhealthy”. Normally complete instrument 
failures are treated as basic events since failure rate data available do not normally 
differentiate between “fail high or low”. If higher resolution is desired in some cases, the 
algorithm selects “high” or “low” according to the functionality of the elements. “High” 
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is selected if the controlled variable increases with the certain output, and vice versa. 
Here we neglect the scenarios of “two elements on the control loop malfunctioning 
simultaneously”, whose failure rates are normally much lower than one element failure. 
It is assumed that the process is normal at the moment the sensor becomes stuck. 
However, the measured value from the sensor is not necessarily equal to the set point 
under normal operation. In practice there are normally differences when the control loop 
is functioning properly. With a proportional or proportional-and-derivative controller, 
this discrepancy is not sufficient to cause a significant deviation of the controlled 
variable upon “sensor stuck” without other disturbances. Figure 3.6 represents the cause-
and-effect fault tree model for a feedback control without integral action.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Fault tree model for feedback control without integral action 
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The subtrees of “controlled variable (+1/10)” represent the deviations of the 
controlled variable without the manipulating variable disturbances, which are actually 
disturbances. They are used in the fault tree models for special features in the follow 
context as well. 
With integral action, the controller will keep on increasing or decreasing until 
saturated given a tiny difference between sensor signal and set point. The controlled 
variable will take off from the original value until the control valve is completely opened 
or closed. From the above discussion, we can see that “sensor stuck” makes the control 
inactive without an integral action, while it renders the control loop unhealthy when an 
integral action is present. The deviation direction (increase or decrease) of the controlled 
variable depends on the sign of the difference and the relationship between the 
difference and controlled variable. As a shortcut, we can decide this by the modes of the 
sensor. If the sensor is positive activated (as most sensors are), the controlled variable 
increases with the set point greater than the sensor output, and vice versa. Since “reset” 
action is widely used in chemical process controls, our cause-and-effect models must be 
modified to accommodate this scenario. Figure 3.7 shows the cause-and-effect fault tree 
model for a feedback control with integral action. 
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Figure 3.7 Fault tree model for feedback control with integral action 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Modeling Feedforward Loops 
Feedforward control is also called open-loop or input-compensated control. In 
principle, feedforward control is designed to compensate for certain kinds of 
disturbances, but it is not able to capture other disturbances. The general block diagram 
and the corresponding fault tree model of feedforward control is shown in Figures 3.8 
and 3.9, respectively. 
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Set point
Sensor
ProcessControlelementController
Uncompensated
disturbances
+
-
+
+
Controlled variable
Compensated disturbances
+
 
 
Figure 3.8 Feedforward control block diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Fault tree model for feedforward control 
 
 
 
In this work, trip systems are also categorized as special feedforward or feedback 
controls. However, instead of just trying to counteract a process disturbance, trip system 
will shutdown (or close) some process or sub-process upon certain exceeding-limit 
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failures (such as pump stops, level too high, level too low, utility failures, etc.) to 
prevent further fault propagation or avoid more serious incidents. Since there is no 
controlled variable, in such cases, whenever we meet these specific conditions (pump 
stop, utility failures) in the fault tree synthesis procedure, we will add an AND gate and 
replace this condition, as in Figure 3.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Fault tree model for trip system 
 
 
 
The treatment for pressure relief and bypass protection is similar to that of trip 
systems. Pressure relief and bypass are typical uni-direction protections. Whenever the 
protection condition (high pressure or bypass conditions) is met during the construction 
of fault trees, an AND gate is used to replace this condition, which is shown in Figure 
3.11 and Figure 3.12. Design errors such as “under design” of relief valve and “over 
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design” of bypass line are not included here by default, but they can be entered by the 
users if they are desired to be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Fault tree model for pressure relief system 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Fault tree model for bypass system 
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3.4.4 Modeling Complex Controls 
Although feedback and feedforward control are the most popular controls in the 
process industry, some complex process controls like nested control and flow ratio 
control are typically used in the process industry as well, especially for some critical 
equipment such as reactors and distillation columns. These places are almost always the 
focus of safety concerns, and are critical in the construction of system fault tree models. 
 
Modeling nested control 
Nested control is also called cascade control. A nested control with two feedback 
loops is shown in Figure 3.13.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Nested control block diagram with two feedback loops 
 
 
 
As we know, nested controls are normally adopted if the dynamic response of the 
slave loop is much faster than the master loop. Generally speaking, nested feedback 
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control is efficient for controlling large/fast disturbances to the secondary controlled 
variable. Also nested control is robust to the zero point drifting of the master controller 
and slow changes occurring inside the slave control loop including the slave sensor. The 
disturbances entering the slave control loops can be corrected much faster by the design 
of a cascade control, and the effective dynamic lag of the master loop will be greatly 
reduced if designed properly. As we know, the performance of a cascade control relies 
on the relative speeds of the components included in the master and slave loops. The 
dynamic response of the slave loop must be much faster than the master loop. If the 
slave sensor is ideal and its transfer function is 1 (which is normally true), the forward 
gain of the slave loop is normally much larger than 1 so that the slave loop can be 
approximated with an equivalent gain of 1. 
When the slave sensor is stuck, the forward gain of the master loop increases 
significantly. The stability of the control loop degrades with increasing gain. The closed 
loop will become oscillatory or unstable upon such a significant forward gain increase, 
which is confirmed by our simulations with Matlab ®. However, though slave sensor 
stuck failure will drive the control loop to abnormality, it is difficult to decide which 
direction it will go and more likely will oscillate. To obtain a conservative estimation, 
we will put “stuck slave sensor” under “unhealthy control” of controlled variable 
deviation. The user is responsible for analyzing its effects if more precision is desired. 
The corresponding fault tree model for a nested control with two feedback loops 
is shown in Figure 3.14.  
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Figure 3.14 Fault tree model for nested control with two feedback loops 
 
 
 
The direction of the secondary controlled variable deviation is determined by the 
characteristics of the process (positive or negative). Here the slave controller and the 
control element are defined as common components for the master control loop and 
slave control loop. The algorithm decides the sign of the secondary controlled variable 
depending on the relationship between the primary and secondary controlled variables. 
The master controller and the slave controller can be combined into one item of 
equipment with master sensor signal, slave sensor signal, and set point as its inputs. For 
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the inner control loop, the cause-and-effect model is the same as a simple feedback loop 
except that the set point of the inner control is determined by the master controller. 
A feedback and a feedforward can be combined together to consist of a nested 
control as well. Figure 3.15 shows a general block diagram for this configuration.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Nested control block diagram with one feedback loop and one feedforward 
loop 
 
 
 
The major disturbance 1 will be compensated by the feedforward loop as well as 
the feedback control. This configuration can tolerate small zero point drifting of the 
slave sensor, compensating controller, master controller, and control valve. The fault tree 
model for this configuration is shown in Figure 3.16. 
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Figure 3.16 Fault tree model for nested control with one feedback loop and one 
feedforward loop 
 
 
 
Other configurations of nested control are possible, and can be incorporated in 
this work by providing their corresponding fault tree models.  
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Modeling flow ratio control 
Flow ratio control is employed in chemical processes to maintain, for example, 
the fuel/air ratio to a furnace or the flow ratio of two feed streams to a reactor. Here the 
flow ratio between two streams is the issue because it is critical to the product quality, 
process safety, or economic costs. Currently we consider only a constant flow ratio 
control, namely, the set point of the ratio between F1 (master flow rate) and F2 (slave 
flow rate) does not depend on time or other process variables. Flow ratio control can be 
open-loop or closed-loop. In an open-loop flow ratio control, the controller is essentially 
a ratio calculator, and its output is transmitted to a control valve directly. A general 
block diagram for an open-loop flow ratio control is shown in Figure 3.17. 
 
 
 
Set point ProcessControlelementController
Disturbances
+
-
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F2
Sensor DisturbancesProcess
F1
 
 
Figure 3.17 Open-loop flow ratio block diagram 
 
 
 
Since there is no control over the master stream F1, the cause-and-effect model is 
the same as that of the process without controls. Sometimes, fault tree models for the 
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slave flow rate may be desired. The fault tree models for deviations of flow ratio are the 
same as that for the slave stream flow, which is presented in Figure 3.18. The master 
stream F1 and slave stream F2 are assumed to be independent without the flow ratio 
control, which is normally true. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.18 Fault tree model for open-loop flow ratio control 
 
 
 
The open-loop flow ratio control is not robust to disturbances such as inlet 
pressure change of the slave stream. Instead engineers sometimes use closed-loop ratio 
control to overcome this disadvantage. The diagram of closed-loop flow ratio control is 
shown in Figure 3.19.  
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Figure 3.19 Slave stream close-loop flow ratio control block diagram 
 
 
 
Here we still do not have any control over the master flow, and the cause-and-
effect model for the master flow is the same as a normal process variable. The 
corresponding fault tree model for flow ratio and slave stream flow rate is shown in 
Figure 3.20. 
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Figure 3.20 Fault tree model for slave stream close loop flow ratio control 
 
 
 
Flow ratio control can be implemented with two independent feedback controls. 
Set points are determined based on flow ratio desired. In this case, the fault tree model 
for feedback control loop will be applied if deviation of flow or flow ratio is traced.  
 
3.5  Tree Rationalization 
Tree rationalization includes consistency checking and tree simplification.  
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3.5.1 Event Consistency 
It is essential to check the consistency among tree events to remove inconsistent 
and unreasonable events and prevent the fault tree construction procedure from going 
forever. There are two types of consistency – serial and parallel consistency.  
Serial consistency is the consistency of events with its upper level events while 
parallel consistency is the consistency of events between two branches of the same AND 
gate. During fault tree construction, the methodology stores all the upper level parents, 
checks for serial consistency, and deletes inconsistent events whenever encountered and 
detected. However, parallel consistency checking must be performed after the initial 
fault tree construction. Events under different branches of the same AND gate are 
examined, and inconsistent events are removed. 
It is also necessary to ensure that events in the fault tree do not violate or go 
beyond the system boundary. Process deviations at the system boundary are treated as 
basic events, which might be top events for adjacent systems. This step can be done 
during fault tree construction. 
 
3.5.2 Tree Simplification 
Fault trees drawn directly from a computer algorithm are normally opaque and 
contain many repeated events. It is not easy to read. A simplification procedure can 
make them concise and understandable to users. Two kinds of simplification are 
performed – algebraic simplification and tree simplification.  
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Algebraic simplification basically deals with certain or negligible events. When a 
certain event (with the probability of 1) is under an OR gate, algebraic simplification is 
performed to remove the parent gates until an AND gate is encountered. When a certain 
event is under an AND gate, this event is deleted directly. If an event with negligible 
probability is under an AND gate, removal of the whole parent gate will continue until 
an OR gate is met. If a negligible event is under an OR gate, this event is deleted 
directly.  
Tree simplification mainly refers to structure suppression. All intermediate 
events with only one child are removed during tree suppression. Some Boolean 
manipulation is capable of converting the fault tree into an equivalent and simpler 
structure. During algebraic simplification and tree simplification, identical events under 
the same gate are removed automatically. 
 
3.6 Summary of Chapter III 
This chapter has been dedicated to describe the basic modeling technique and 
overall methodology. The basic idea of the proposed methodology is to capture the 
cause-and-effect logic among equipment behaviors, human responses, and environment 
factors around each item of equipment directly into mini fault trees.  
Process block diagram is used to represent the system topology, configuration 
information, initiating states, and physical boundaries. Simple checklists are used to 
assist the analysts to identify potential hazardous incidents. Component modeling 
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techniques are discussed in Section 3.3. Fault propagation within and between 
components is addressed.  
Once the top event has been selected, the algorithm proceeds to find the 
corresponding cause-and-effect models in the database to trace the top event down to 
deviations in the process variables. Then intermediate events are developed, and relevant 
cause-and-effect models are generated directly from the digraphs, failure mode table, 
and external event table until a system boundary or primary events are reached. Control 
loops and special features will be managed by their corresponding fault tree models 
(template trees), which are discussed in detail in Section 3.4. Serial consistency checking 
is carried out during fault tree construction, and parallel consistency is performed after 
initial fault tree has been developed. Finally, a simplification procedure will make the 
generated fault tree concise and easy to understand. 
The idea of this research is to make use of the available knowledge about 
common devices in the CPI in fault tree construction and reduce human force and expert 
time required. Though a computer will perform the dull part of the methodology, human 
interactions are required in many places to input system block diagrams and 
configurations, decide top events, and incorporate the cause-and-effect models for 
special process components and controls. Users are responsible for verifying the 
completeness and correctness of final fault tree models. User decision overrides a 
computer during or after tree construction.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATABASE STRUCTURE 
 
A prototype computer package has been developed to demonstrate the capability 
of this methodology. To implement this methodology, user interface, algorithm/rules, 
and data are required. Software application architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. The 
computer language used to implement this program is Microsoft Visual Basic ®. 
Microsoft Access ® is the primary carrier for the database system. Process block 
diagrams and fault trees are in the form of Microsoft Visio ® files. Database system 
employed in this methodology is discussed in Chapter IV while user interfaces and 
algorithm flow charts are covered in Chapter V. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Software application architecture 
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Growing from a computerized analog of paper files and folders containing facts 
and data, database systems are now becoming more of a well-disciplined collection of 
information. An improper design of database might be poorly organized, inefficient, lack 
integrity, and compromise the use of database ultimately. On the other hand, a good 
database design not only meets the current needs but also incorporates future 
requirements.  
A database begins with a concept of the overall application. The application 
should be able to take what you want and translate it into what the computer can handle. 
In this work, information about component modeling, equipment, and special features 
are required in the synthesis of fault trees. Many database software products are 
currently available on the open market. No matter how powerful these database 
management systems are to provide data manipulation and data management support, 
they require users to design the data structure and understand the details of the data, 
record contents, keys, etc. Microsoft Access ® is employed in this work to implement 
the database described hereafter.  
Some normal forms have been developed toward database design to avoid 
redundancy, inconsistency, and anomalies. Though normalized design penalizes data 
retrieval in the sense that data may have to be retrieved from several tuples, it is the most 
valuable principle to reduce redundancy and remove anomalies, and thus facilitates 
database management and reduces storage requirements substantially. There are formal 
mathematical definitions for each normal form (Bagchi & Chaudhri, 1989). Their 
narrative and brief descriptions are listed as follows: 
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• The first normal form: Every data entry for each attribute is non-
decomposable.  
• The second normal form: Every “non-key” attribute in the relation is 
dependent on the key.  
• The third normal form: No non-key attribute identifies another non-key 
attribute.  
• The fourth normal form: No more than one multi-valued fact is allowed 
in the same relation. 
 
There are two databases in this project – the public database and the specific 
database. The public database includes digraphs, failure modes and effects, and failure 
rate data for common devices and cause-and-effect models for common special features 
in the process industry. The specific database includes equipment, equipment state, 
equipment connections, cause-and-effect models for components and special features, 
external events, and initial events in a particular process. This methodology will first 
search the associated specific database for cause-and-effect models before it turns to the 
public database. In other words, the specific database takes priority over the public 
database.  
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4.1 Public Database 
As pointed out in Chapter III, each chemical plant is unique, however, they have 
many universal equipment, materials, and processes. For those universal components, 
their functionality, failure modes, failure mechanisms, and failure effects have been 
explored extensively. This knowledge is stored in eight tables in the public database in 
this methodology. These eight tables and their structures are covered through Sections 
4.1.1 to 4.1.3.  
Note that numbers in the parentheses in the type column indicate the length of 
text. Primary keys are pointed out in the tables. 
 
4.1.1 Tables Related to Component Models 
During fault tree construction, component cause-and-effect models are directly 
drawn from digraph tables, failure modes and effects tables, and external events tables. 
External events are highly dependent on the system and its environment, which are 
better considered in the specific database. Digraph relationship and failure modes and 
effects of a certain component are influenced by its state in the system and the 
environment as well. However, they have a decent level of independence and can be 
extracted. System-independent information is included in the public database while 
system-dependent information enters the specific database for the particular process. 
Two tables in the public database, the public digraph table and the public failure modes 
and effects table, are related to component models, which are presented separately 
hereafter. 
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Public Digraph Table 
The public digraph table is devoted to model the functionality of common 
components and the relationship between their inputs and outputs. The data fields and 
their data types are shown in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Design view of the public digraph table 
 
Field Type Description 
Index AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Equipment type Text (25) Equipment type 
Equipment Subtype Text (25) Equipment sub type 
Character Text (25) Primary characteristics 
Equipment State Text (10) Equipment state 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Number Influence of input on output 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
Access lookup wizards are applied to the input variable, the output variable, and 
the relationship to assist users when entering data. Lookup relationships are defined in 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. 
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Table 4.2 Lookup relationship for “relationship” 
 
Relationship Description 
-10 Large decrease 
-1 Medium decrease 
+1 Medium increase 
+10  Large Increase 
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Table 4.3 Lookup relationship for “input variable” and “output variable” 
 
Abbreviation Process Variable 
C Concentration 
Cin Inlet concentration 
Cout Outlet concentration 
Fcl,in Cool inlet flow rate 
Fcl,out Cool outlet flow rate 
Fh,in Hot inlet flow rate 
Fh,out Hot outlet flow rate 
Fin Inlet flow rate 
Fout Outlet flow rate 
L Level 
P Pressure 
Pin Inlet pressure 
Pout Outlet pressure 
Sigin Input signal 
Sigout Output signal 
T Temperature 
Tcl,in Cool inlet temperature 
Tcl,out Cool outlet temperature 
Th,in Hot inlet temperature 
Th,out Hot outlet temperature 
Tin Inlet temperature 
Tout Outlet temperature 
Uin Power 
 
 
 
Public Failure Modes and Effects Table 
For many common materials, processes, equipment and control mechanisms, 
their failure modes, failure mechanisms and failure effects have already been explored. 
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This knowledge is especially useful to trace fault propagation in the construction of fault 
trees. Some failure modes introduce process deviations while others may change the 
relationships between input variables and output variables of a certain component. 
Failure modes and effects table stores this information, and its structure is shown in 
Table 4.4.  
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Design view of the public failure modes and effects table 
 
Field Type Description 
Index AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Equipment type Text (25) Equipment type 
Equipment Subtype Text (25) Equipment sub type 
Equipment State Text (10) Equipment state 
Failure modes Text (100) Failure modes 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Number Influence of input on output 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
Again, lookup wizards are applied to the input variable, the output variable, and 
the relationship, which have been shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.  
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4.1.2 Tables Related to Failure Rate Calculation 
Good design not only meets the current needs, but also considers flexibility for 
future development and extendibility. Although this dissertation does not include the 
evaluation of fault trees, tables that may be used in the calculation of fault tree models 
are developed for future research. These tables store the failure rate data and failure 
distribution for widely used equipment such as pump, seals, or valves in the chemical 
processes. Public failure rate tables are shared by all the fault tree files, covering the 
failure rate data for common components. Failure distributions are extracted from the 
failure distribution table and used together with data from the failure rate table to 
determine failure probabilities. The public failure rate table and the failure distribution 
table are presented in the following context. 
 
Public Failure Rate Table 
Failure probability is determined by failure rate and time together with failure 
distribution. The design view of the public failure rate table is shown in Table 4.5. 
Calculation scheme of basic events is presented in Section 4.2.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
77
Table 4.5 Design view of the public failure rate table 
 
Field Type Description 
Index AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Equipment Type Text (25) Equipment, process or human 
Equipment Subtype Text (25) Equipment manufacture, ID etc. 
Character1 Text (25) Primary characteristic 
Character2 Text (25) Characteristic 
Character3 Text (25) Characteristic 
Failure modes Text (100) Failure modes 
Parameter1 Number Failure rate parameter 
Parameter2 Number Failure rate parameter 
Parameter3 Number Failure rate parameter 
Unit Date (Y,M,D,H) Unit of failure rate parameter 
Description Text (100) Description of the failure 
Source Text (50) Source of the failure rate data 
Comment Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
A lookup wizard is available for the unit with the listed values of Y, M, D, and H 
indicating year, month, day, and hour, respectively. 
 
Failure Distribution Table 
The failure distribution table as shown in Table 4.6 mainly takes care of different 
failure distribution functions. The purpose of making failure distributions into the format 
of a database table is to have the extendibility and flexibility to include future failure 
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distributions. Any possible failure rate distribution can be easily included by simply 
adding a record in this table.  
 
 
 
Table 4.6 Design view of the failure distribution table 
 
Field Type Description 
DistributionID Number (key) Failure distribution ID 
Formula Text (50) Corresponding calculation formula 
Range Text (150) The applicable area of this distribution 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Tables Related to Special Features 
As mentioned in Chapter III, special features are critical in fault tree synthesis, 
hence the database representation of special features. According to the generalized fault 
tree model for special features described in Chapter III, there are four tables defined that 
pertain to special features, which are the special features table, the components table, the 
capability table, and the instrument failure effects table.  
Some entries such as controlled variable, component ID, etc cannot be decided 
precisely in the public database in advance for any particular process. When users select 
to use a cause-and-effect model for special features in the public database for a specific 
process, the selected records are copied to the specific database for that process 
automatically. User inputs are required for equipment ID for all the components, 
controlled variables, or compensated failures.  
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Public Special Features Table 
The special features table includes primary information regarding controlled 
variables, compensated failures, and special feature types (feedback, feedforward, 
bypass, trip, or relief). The table structure and data types are shown in Table 4.7.  
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Design view of the public special feature table 
 
Field Type Description 
Special feature ID Number (key) Special feature ID 
Type Text (50) Type of special feature (feedback, bypass etc) 
EquipmentID Text (10) Equipment ID of the controlled variable 
Controlled variable Text (10) Controllable variable 
Compensated failure Text (100) Compensated variable (feedforward) 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
Here equipment ID, controlled variable, and compensated failure are left with a 
default value. When users select a cause and effect model in the public database for a 
particular system, all the relevant records in the special feature components table, the 
capability table, and the instrument failure effects table are automatically updated 
accordingly. A lookup wizard is defined for “type” as in Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8 Lookup relationship for “type” in the special feature table 
 
Type Description 
Feedback Feedback control 
Feedforward Feedforward control 
Bypass Bypass protection 
Trip Trip system 
Relief Pressure relief system 
Nested Nested control 
Ratio Flow ratio control 
 
 
 
Public Special Feature Components Table 
Information on constituent components of any special features is stored in the 
special feature components table. As mentioned above, components ID are given some 
default numbers in the public database. When a user selects the associated special 
feature ID, the methodology requires the user to input equipment IDs for constituent 
components. Related records in the capability table and instrument failure effects table 
are updated automatically while the user enters the data. The design view of the public 
special feature components table is shown in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9 Design view of the public special feature components table 
 
Field Type Description 
Index AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Components ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Special feature ID Integer Special feature ID 
Structure components Text (50) Components of the special feature 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
Public Special Feature Instrument Failure Effects Table 
Instrument failures of the special features play a fundamental role in the 
modeling of its cause-and-effect relationship. Different process control and safe guards 
have different tolerability toward the same instrument failures. According to the 
generalized cause-and-effect model for special features described in Chapter III, the 
effects of any instrument failure are categorized as either “inactive” or “unhealthy”. The 
program searches the instrument failures of the concerned special feature and adds them 
under the desired sub-tree according to their effects. The data structure design of the 
public special feature instrument failure effects table is shown in Table 4.10.  
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Table 4.10 Design view of the public special feature instrument failure effects table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Instrument failure ID 
Special feature ID Number Special feature ID 
Component ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Failure Modes Text (100) Instrument failure modes 
Effects Boolean Unhealthy or inactive 
Comments Text (100) Other Comments 
 
 
 
For the sake of programming, the effects of instrument failures are represented 
by Boolean variables in the database. The lookup relationship defined for “effects” is 
shown in Table 4.11.  
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Lookup relationship for special feature instrument failure “effects” 
 
 Effects 
Yes Unhealthy 
No Inactive 
 
 
 
Public Special Feature Capability Table 
Different special features have different control or compensation capability with 
regard to process deviations. Even with the same special feature scheme, the capability 
of controlling or compensating faults depends on the way it is used in the process and 
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the environment it is surrounded by. The public special feature capability table stores the 
information of capability toward process deviations and faults. The design view of the 
public special feature capability table is provided in Table 4.12.  
 
 
 
Table 4.12 Design view of the public special feature capability table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Special feature ID Number ID 
Component ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Affected variable Text (10) Process variable / failures 
Deviation Number Deviation of affecting variable 
Effects Boolean Uncontrollable or controllable 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
The lookup wizard has been defined for “deviation”, which is similar to that of 
“relationship” shown in Table 4.2.  
For the sake of programming, the capability of special features is represented by 
Boolean variables in the database. The lookup relationship defined for “capability” is 
shown in Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13 Lookup relationship for special feature instrument failure “capability” 
 
 Effects 
Yes Controllable 
No Uncontrollable 
 
 
 
4.2 Specific Database 
Contrary to the public database, specific databases are associated with each 
particular process, which is represented by a Microsoft Visio ® file in this work. 
Information regarding equipment, component modeling, top events, failure rates, and 
special features are included in this database. It should be emphasized that all tables in 
the specific databases are owned by the associated process only and not available for use 
by other processes. 
 
4.2.1 Tables Related to Equipment 
As described in Chapter III, each item of equipment in the process is represented 
by one block in the system block diagram. Some characteristics of the equipment are 
required in the methodology. Equipment ID, system boundary, equipment type, 
equipment characteristics, equipment states, and connections between them are stored in 
three tables, respectively. Data fields and data types of these three tables are presented in 
this section. 
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Equipment Table 
Equipment table is dedicated to store information about equipment ID, boundary, 
equipment type, subtype, manufacturers, and other characteristics. Equipment type, 
subtype, and other characteristics are used to locate its failure rate data in the public 
database if they do not exist in the specific failure rate table. Data structure and types are 
given in Table 4.14. Equipment IDs are taken as the primary key for this table. It is 
unique and not allowed to be duplicated. 
 
 
 
Table 4.14 Design view of the equipment table 
 
Field Type Description 
Equipment ID Text (20) (key) Unique equipment ID 
Boundary Boolean System boundary 
Equipment Type Text (25) Equipment type 
Equipment Subtype Text (25) Equipment subtype 
Character1 Text (25) Character 1 
Character2 Text (25) Character 2 
Character3 Text (25) Character 3 
Manufacturer Text (25) Manufacturer 
Comment Text (100) Comments 
 
 
 
The entry of system boundary is a Boolean variable to indicate whether the 
equipment is on a physical boundary or not. Deviations of input process variables of the 
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equipment on a physical boundary will not be developed further and remain as basic 
events.  
 
Equipment States Table 
The cause-and-effect models for components are determined by not only its own 
characteristics but also its initial states and normal states in the system. Digraphs, failure 
modes and effects, external events, and initial events are directly dependent on the states 
of the equipment. Such kind of information is in the equipment states table. Only 
equipment that has more than one possible state has corresponding records in this table. 
Table 4.15 shows the data structure of the equipment states table.  
 
 
 
Table 4.15 Design view of the equipment states table 
 
Field Type Description 
Equipment ID Text (20) (Key) Unique equipment ID 
Initial State Text (10) Initial equipment state 
Normal State Text (10) Normal state 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
Topology Table 
The connections between components are used to trace down concerned process 
deviations during fault tree construction. This information is stored in the topology table, 
 
 
 
87
which can be automatically obtained from process block diagram file by computer 
codes. The database design view of the topology table is shown in Table 4.16. 
 
 
 
Table 4.16 Design view of the topology table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber Record index 
FromEquipID Text (20) (Key) Starting equipment ID 
FromPortName Text (10) Port name 
ToEquipID Text (20) Ending equipment ID 
ToPortName Text (10) Port name 
 
 
 
Port Names are defined for each item of equipment, which is normally 
represented by “in” and “out”. 
 
4.2.2 Tables Related to Component Models 
Digraph relationship and failure modes and effects of certain component are 
influenced by its state in the system and the environment though they have certain 
degree of independence. System-independent information is included in the public 
database while system-dependent information for the particular process enters the 
specific database. Four tables in the specific database, the specific digraph table, the 
specific failure modes and effects table, the external events table, and the initial events 
table, are related to component models, which are presented separately hereafter. 
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Specific Digraph Table 
Specific digraph tables are devoted to model the functionality of components in a 
particular process and the relationship between their inputs and outputs. The fields and 
their data types are shown in Table 4.17. Different from the public digraph table, 
equipment ID is available in the specific digraph table. All information about that 
particular equipment can be found in the equipment related tables.  
 
 
 
Table 4.17 Design view of the specific digraph table 
 
Field Type Description 
Equipment ID Text (20) Equipment ID 
Equipment State Text (10) Equipment state 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Number Influence of input on output 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
As mentioned in the public database, Microsoft Access ® lookup wizards are 
applied to the relationship, the input variable, and the output variable to guide the user to 
enter data, which are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. 
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Specific Failure Modes and Effects Table 
Chemical plants may contain materials, processes, equipment or control 
mechanisms that are not commonly found in the process industry. Failure modes, failure 
mechanisms, and failure effects for those components must be entered in the failure 
modes and effects table for the generated fault tree models to be correct and complete. A 
failure can lead to process deviations, or change the functional relationship between 
inputs and outputs. The input variable column is left blank if the failure mode only 
introduces process deviations. The data structure and data types of specific failure modes 
and effects table are presented in Table 4.18. 
 
 
 
Table 4.18 Design view of the specific failure modes and effects table 
 
Field Type Description 
Equipment ID Text (20) Equipment ID 
Equipment State Text (10) Equipment state 
Failure modes Text (100) Failure modes 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Number Influence of input on output 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
Again, lookup wizards are defined for the input variable, the output variable, and 
the relationship, which have been shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.  
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External Events Table 
External environment influences any process in a sophisticated way. The effects 
of external events are highly dependent on the process under study. No one can predict 
the effects of an external event without the information of the concerned process. Some 
external events are typical common cause failures such as external fires and flooding. 
All the external events and their effects are listed in the external events table. Similar to 
failure modes and effects, external events can either introduce process deviations or 
change the functional relationship between inputs and outputs. To save computer 
storage, external events can be defined not only to equipment, but also to the sub-system 
or system, in which all the components in the system inherit the external events. The 
data structure of external events table is shown in Table 4.19.  
 
 
 
Table 4.19 Design view of the external events table 
 
Field Type Description 
EquipmentID Text (20) Affected equipment ID 
Description Text (100) Description 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Number Relationship 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
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Again, a lookup wizard is defined for “relationship” to guide users when entering 
data, which is shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Initial Events table 
The cause-and-effect relationship for a particular component may be influenced 
by some initial events as well. The data structure is essentially the same as that of 
external events table, which is provided in Table 4.20.  
 
 
 
Table 4.20 Design view of the initial events table 
 
Field Type Description 
EquipmentID Text (20) Affected equipment ID 
Description Text (100) Description 
Input Variable Text (10) Affecting variable 
Output Variable Text (10) Affected variable 
Relationship Integer Relationship 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
A lookup wizard is defined for “relationship” as in Table 4.2.  
 
4.2.3 Tables Related to Failure Rate Calculations 
As pointed out in the previous section, some facilities may contain materials, 
processes, equipment, and control mechanisms that are not commonly found in the 
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process industry. Failure rate data for those components might not be available in the 
public database. In some cases, failure rate data for some commonly used devices can be 
different from the data in the public database because of the unique environment and 
process conditions in a particular system. Under these circumstances, failure rates must 
be stored in the specific database to override the data in the public database. The data 
design view of the specific failure rate table is shown in Table 4.21. The fundamentals 
for calculating the failure rates remain the same, and failure distribution are extracted 
from the public database.  
 
 
 
Table 4.21 Design view of the specific failure rate table 
 
Field Type Description 
Equipment ID Text (20) (key) Equipment, process or human 
Failure Modes Text (5) Failure modes 
Parameter1 Number Failure rate parameter 
Parameter2 Number Failure rate parameter 
Parameter3 Number Failure rate parameter 
Unit Text (1) Time unit of failure rate 
Description Text (100) Description of the failure 
Source Text (50) Source of the failure rate data 
Comment Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
A lookup wizard is available for the unit with the listed values of Y, M, D, and H 
indicating year, month, day, and hour, respectively. 
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4.2.4 Tables Related to Special Features 
It is rather difficult and impractical to predict all the special features and their 
corresponding cause-and-effect models in the public database. In particular, the cause-
and-effect models selected from the public database by the users are copied to the 
associated specific database to match the equipment IDs and facilitate the automatic 
fault tree construction procedure. Similar to that in public database, there are four tables 
defined in the specific database that pertain to special features, which are the special 
features table, components table, capability table and instrument failure effects table.  
As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, whenever users choose a cause-and-effect model 
for special features in the public database for a specific process, the selected records are 
copied to the specific database for that process automatically. User inputs are required 
for equipment IDs for the components, controlled variables, or compensated failures. 
 
Specific Special Features Table 
The special features table includes information regarding the controlled variable, 
the compensated failure, and the special feature type (feedback, feedforward, bypass, 
trip, or relief). The table structure and data type are shown in Table 4.22.  
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Table 4.22 Design view of the specific special features table 
 
Field Type Description 
Special feature ID Number (key) Special feature ID 
Type Text (50) Type of special feature (feedback, bypass etc) 
Equipment ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Controlled variable Text (10) Controllable variable 
Deviation Number Controlled deviation 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
When users change equipment IDs, controlled variables, or compensated failures, 
all the relevant records in the special feature components table, capability table, and 
instrument failure effects table are automatically updated accordingly. A lookup wizard 
is defined for “type” as in Table 4.8. Here the field “deviation” is reserved for some uni-
direction process control or protection. 
 
Specific Special Feature Components Table 
Information on constituent components of any special features is stored in the 
special feature components table. The design view of the specific special features 
components table is shown in Table 4.23. 
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Table 4.23 Design view of the specific special feature components table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Components ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Special feature ID Number Special feature ID 
Components Text (50) Components of the special feature 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
Specific Special Feature Instrument Failures Effects Table 
According to the generalized cause-and-effect model for special features, the 
effects of any instrument failure are categorized as either “inactive” or “unhealthy”. The 
program searches the instrument failures of the concerned special feature and adds them 
under the desired sub-tree according to their effects. The data structure design of public 
special feature instrument failures effects table is shown in Table 4.24, which is 
essentially the same as that of public database.  
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Table 4.24 Design view of the public special feature instrument failures effects table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Instrument failure ID 
Special feature ID Number Special feature ID 
Component ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Failure Modes Text (100) Instrument failure modes 
Effects Boolean Unhealthy or inactive 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
Specific Special Feature Capability Table 
Similar to the public special feature capability table, the specific special feature 
capability table stores the information of control or compensation capability of special 
features toward process deviations and faults. Its design view is shown in Table 4.25.  
 
 
 
Table 4.25 Design view of the public special feature capability table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
Special feature ID Number ID 
Component ID Text (10) Equipment ID 
Affected variable Text (10) Process variable / failures 
Deviation Number Deviation of affecting variable 
Capability Boolean Uncontrollable or controllable 
Comments Text (100) Other comments 
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4.2.5 Top Events Table 
Top event identification is crucial in the fault tree construction although its 
importance is always undermined. In this work, simple checklists are used to help the 
analyst identify potential hazards in the process. However, a detailed and systematic 
hazard identification technique is preferred. All top events associated with the process 
are saved in the top events table, whose data structure is defined in Table 4.26.  
 
 
 
Table 4.26 Design view of the top events table 
 
Field Type Description 
Top Event ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
GateID Number Gate ID 
Description Text (250) Top event description 
Comment Text (100) Other comments 
 
 
 
4.2.6 Table Related to Fault Trees 
Fault tree files can take many forms. Textual, tabular, graphical, or database 
forms can all be used to represent fault trees. In this work, fault trees are stored in 
database tables for the sake of data manipulation. Prototype computer codes are 
programmed to convert database tables to Visio file for analysts to review and update 
fault trees. Four tables are associated with fault tree models: basic events table, gates 
table, fault tree table, and stack table, which are discussed separately in this section. 
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Among them stack tables are used in the programming to record all the intermediate 
gates that need further development.  
Basic Events Table 
Basic events are defined to be primary failures, external events, or human 
activities that are not to be developed further in a fault tree. It can be failures of sub-
system, equipment, or equipment parts, decided by the analysis resolution desired. The 
fields and their types are presented in Table 4.27. 
 
 
 
Table 4.27 Design view of the basic events table 
 
Field Type Description 
Name Text (20) (key) Name of the basic event 
Equipment ID Text (20) Unique equipment ID (P&ID) 
Distribution Number Failure distribution 
Mission Time Number Mission time or failure rate 
Unit Text (1) Time unit 
Description Text (250) Description of the failure 
Source Text (50) Source of the information 
Probability Number Calculated probability 
Comment Text (100) Further comments 
 
 
 
Lookup relationship has been defined for “unit” and “distribution”, in which 
distribution is extracted from the failure distribution table in the public database. A 
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lookup wizard is available for the unit with the listed values of Y, M, D, and H 
indicating year, month, day, and hour, respectively. 
To calculate the probability of basic events, the corresponding failure distribution 
is decided by the distribution field, and then the failure rate is extracted from the specific 
database or the public database. Finally mission time is used with the failure rate to 
calculate the probability. This procedure for calculation of basic event probability is 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
Basic events table 
 
Name EquipmentID Description Distribution Mission Unit Probability  … 
 HE-1  1    … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific failure rate table 
 
Figure 4.2 Calculation of basic event probability 
 
 
 
This figure extracts failure rates or probability from the specific database. 
Calculation of basic event probability using failure rates from the public database is 
similar.  
Distribution Formula ... 
1 1-e-λt …
ID EquipmentID FailureModes FailureRate Unit … 
 HE-1    … 
Failure distribution table
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Gates Table 
The records in the gates table are a one-to-one map of the intermediate gates in 
the fault tree. Data structure of the gates table is shown in Table 4.28. 
 
 
 
Table 4.28 Design view of the gates table 
 
Field Type Description 
GateID Number (Key) Gate ID 
Description Text (250) Description of the gate event 
Completeness Boolean Completeness of the gate 
EquipmentID Text (20) Equipment ID 
Process variable Text (10) Process variable 
Deviation Number Deviation 
Probability Number Calculated probability 
Time Date Date when calculated 
Comment Text Further comments 
 
 
 
Here a completeness field is used to indicate whether the gate is completed or not. 
If not, the gate is an intermediate event and needs to be developed further.  
 
Fault Tree Table 
The fault tree table stores the structure of fault trees, namely, the parent, its child 
and the logic between them. Many gates have more than one child, thus more than one 
record in the fault tree table. Data fields and their types are presented in Table 4.29.  
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Table 4.29 Design view of the fault tree table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
GateID Number Gate ID 
Type Text (3) Gate logic (AND,OR,EQU,XOR) 
Child Text (10) Child of the gate 
 
 
 
Stack Table 
There is no definition of a data structure “stack” in Microsoft Visual Basic ®. 
The stack table is employed to serve the function of a stack, which is a typical “first 
come last out” data structure. All the intermediate events are pushed into the stack table 
in the program. AutoNumber is a data type in Microsoft Access ® such that it will be 
automatically assigned in an increasing order when a record is inserted. Each time the 
gate event with the maximum ID is popped out from the stack table to ensure “first come 
last out” principle. The design view of the stack table is presented in Table 4.30.  
 
 
 
Table 4.30 Design view of the stack table 
 
Field Type Description 
ID AutoNumber (key) Record index 
GateID Number Gate ID 
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4.3 Summary of Chapter IV 
This chapter has been devoted to the discussion of database structures. A 
relational database system has been developed to implement the methodology. Microsoft 
Access ® is the database management system selected for this purpose.  
There are two databases in this project – the public database and the specific 
database, discussed in Section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. The public database includes 
digraphs, failure modes and effects and failure rate data for common devices and cause-
and-effect models for common special features in the process industry. Eight tables are 
included in the public database and are divided into three types: tables related to 
component models (4.1.1), tables related to failure rate calculation (4.1.2), and tables 
related to special features (4.1.3). The specific database includes information on 
equipment, equipment state, equipment connections, cause-and-effect models for 
components and special features, external events, and initial events in a particular 
process. There are seventeen tables involved in the specific database. They are 
categorized into six types: tables related to equipment (4.2.1), tables related to 
component models (4.2.2), tables related to failure rate calculation (4.2.3), tables related 
to special features (4.2.4), top event table (4.2.5), and tables related to fault trees (4.2.6).  
This methodology first searches the associated specific database for cause-and-
effect models before it turns to the public database. In other words, the specific database 
takes priority over the public database. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1 Overview 
A prototype computer package has been developed to demonstrate the capability 
of this proposed methodology. This prototype computer package consists of four major 
modules: top event editor, component model editor, fault tree generator, and fault tree 
editor, which are addressed in detail in the following sections. The computer language 
used to implement this program is Microsoft Visual Basic ®. Microsoft Access is the 
primary carrier for the database system. Users can modify records in the database 
through Microsoft Access ® directly. Database connectors are programmed so that users 
can add, update, and delete records in the public or specific database in the component 
model editor. Process block diagrams and fault trees are in the form of Microsoft Visio 
files.  
As mentioned, this program consists of four major modules. System structure is 
shown in Figure 5.1. Only major error handlings such as “database not found” are 
considered in the programming. “Help” and “exit” buttons are provided for each module.  
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Figure 5.1 System structure 
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5.2 Top Event Editor 
As shown in Figure 5.1, there are six command buttons in the top event editor, 
two of which are “help” and “exit”. Simple checklists are used to help users identify 
typical top events such as “fire”, “explosion”, and “toxic release”. A “User-defined top 
events” button is provided for the user to enter top events directly into the specific 
database.  
The flow chart for “fire” event identification is presented here as an illustration. 
For fire to occur, fuel, oxygen, and ignition energy must be present. The basic idea in 
this algorithm is to examine every possible location for these three elements. If the 
inventory of a flammable/combustible material is enough to maintain a fire if ignited, the 
program will proceed to check whether the area is classified as intrinsically safe or not. 
If the answer is “no”, fire events are possible. Gates table, top events table, and fault tree 
table are then updated. The program then continues to prompt the user to enter 
information about protections not in the P&ID such as sprinkler system, dry chemical 
system, or other fire protection systems and their potential failure modes. The top events 
table, the gates table, and the fault tree table are updated according to the user inputs. 
Finally, a multi-check box is employed to incorporate the containment failure modes of 
flammable/combustible materials. This program iterates until all the places containing 
flammable/combustible materials have been treated. The flow chart of fire event 
identification is shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Fire event identification flow chart 
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Figure 5.2 continued 
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5.3 Component Model Editor 
As mentioned in the overview section, Microsoft Access ® database 
management system has been employed to implement the public database and the 
specific database. Users can manipulate and manage data records directly in the Access 
interface. Database connectors for the public database and the specific database are 
provided in this work, especially for those who do not have the Microsoft Access ® 
software.  
Entering the component modeling editor module, users will find two command 
buttons: public database editor and specific database editor. Each table described in 
Chapter IV is provided with a database connector. To improve the efficiency of 
programming, efforts have been carried out to provide a universal database connector via 
the Access ADO object. Only a database file name and table name need to be specified 
for each of the 25 table editors. The database connector for the specific failure modes 
and effects table is shown in Figure 5.3 as an example. All the other table editors take 
the same form as Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3 The specific failure modes and effects table editor 
 
 
 
5.4 Fault Tree Generator 
A fault tree generator builds fault tree models automatically by extracting 
information from the public database or the specific database. The principle and steps 
are discussed in Chapter III, and a detailed flow chart of the fault tree generator is 
presented in Figure 5.4. The default description for gates in the program is a 
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combination of the equipment ID, the process variable, and the deviation. Users can 
modify them if desired. 
 
5.5 Fault Tree Editor 
A fault tree editor is provided to review and edit fault trees generated from the 
fault tree generator. As described in Chapter IV, fault tree structures are stored in the 
form of a database table in the specific database – fault tree table. Though it is efficient 
and easy for programming implementation, it is not easy to review and modify.  
In order to solve the above mentioned difficulties, three functionalities are 
provided in this editor, namely, “open a Visio file to update DB”, “create a complete 
Visio file from DB”, and “create a simplified Visio file from DB”.  
Fault trees drawn directly from a computer are normally diverging. A 
simplification procedure makes them concise and easy to read. This simplification step is 
discussed in detail in Section 3.5.2. Because fault tree evaluation is not covered in this 
dissertation, Boolean simplification is not implemented. The simplification function 
reads the fault tree table, performs a tree simplification procedure and stores the 
simplified tree as a new Visio file.  
User verification is required to ensure the correctness of final fault trees. After 
reviewing the fault trees generated from computer codes, the user may change fault trees 
based on their own understanding. This new Visio file is read by “open a Visio file to 
update DB” button and manipulates database records to match the tree structure.  
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Figure 5.4 Fault tree generator flow chart 
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Figure 5.4 continued 
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Figure 5.4 continued 
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The procedures of these three functionalities are discussed in the following 
context, and their corresponding flow charts are presented to illustrate the detail 
implementation in the computer, respectively.  
Information about top events, gate nodes, event nodes, and connections between 
them are extracted from the database and stored in “dictionaries”. “Dictionary” is a 
special data type defined in Microsoft Visual Basic, which has the typical function of a 
dictionary. Each top event is assigned with one Visio map, in which levels are defined. 
Each record in the Visio maps dictionary is a new page in the generated Visio document. 
Numbers of the leaves under each gate are calculated and stored in a dictionary as well. 
These numbers are used later to determine the distance between the nodes in the same 
level. To create a simplified Visio fault tree map, each record in the “connections” 
dictionary is scanned recursively to remove those gates having only one child. A well-
structured Visio file for fault trees is drawn based on these dictionaries. Figure 5.5 is the 
flow chart for creating a Visio file for both the complete and the simplified version of 
fault trees since they share many functions and subroutines.  
To update tables in the specific database from Visio files, top events, gate nodes, 
event nodes, and connections between them are extracted from the Visio file and 
recorded in two dictionaries – “nodes” and “parent nodes”. Then nodes, gates and events 
dictionaries are derived from the parent node and connector dictionaries. All the records 
containing the same node gate ID as records in the node dictionary are deleted, and then 
new records are inserted into the database based on the new dictionaries created. Figure 
5.6 shows the flow chart for updating the database from Visio files.  
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Figure 5.5 Flow chart for creating Visio files of fault trees 
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Figure 5.5 continued 
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Figure 5.6 Flow chart for updating the database from Visio files 
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5.6 Summary of Chapter V 
A prototype computer package has been developed to demonstrate the capability 
of this proposed methodology. This prototype computer package is presented in detail in 
this chapter. The Microsoft Visual Basic ® language is the primary language for coding, 
and the system structure is provided in the overview section. Four major modules, top 
event editor, component model editor, fault tree generator, and fault tree editor, are 
discussed separately in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.  
The top event editor serves the purpose of helping the analyst identify potential 
top events and defining user-defined top events. Fire event identification is described as 
an example in Section 5.2. The component model editor is essentially database 
connectors, or table editors for both the public database and the specific database. There 
are a total of 25 database connectors, which are implemented through the Microsoft 
Access ADO object library. Users can modify records in the database in Microsoft 
Access directly, or database connectors are provided in the package especially for users 
without the Microsoft Access. The fault tree generator is the core of the proposed 
methodology. A detailed programming flow chart is presented in Section 5.4. Fault tree 
structures are stored as a table in the specific database. To facilitate the review and 
modification of fault trees, three functionalities are provided in fault tree editor, namely, 
“open a Visio file to update DB”, “create a complete Visio file from DB”, and “create a 
simplified Visio file from DB”. These functions are discussed in Section 5.5 in detail 
with their corresponding programming flow charts.  
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Only major error handlings such as “database not found” are considered in the 
programming. “Help” and “exit” are provided for each module. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDIES* 
 
To be programmed in computer codes and applied in a real case, the proposed 
methodology must be tested against substantial examples. Any computer codes must be 
carefully examined and extensively verified before being used in real applications. It is 
not recommended to rely on the computer-aided approach wholly since many of the 
problems in system design can be discovered during the analysis process. 
Two case studies are presented in this chapter to illustrate the methodology. The 
first one is a nitric acid cooling process adapted from Lapp and Powers (1977), which is 
a seminal publication in the history of computer-aided fault tree synthesis. The second 
one is an example of fire event identification for a storage tank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Reprinted from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 15, No. 4, 
Wang Y., T.L. Teague, H.H. West, & M.S. Mannan, A New Algorithm for Computer-
Aided Fault Tree Synthesis, 265-277, Copyright (2002), with permission from Elsevier. 
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6.1 Case Study 1 
6.1.1 Process Description 
This process is adapted from Lapp and Powers (1977), which is to cool one hot 
nitric acid stream with cooling water before entering the reactor where it reacts with 
benzene to produce nitrobenzene. The process diagram is shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Process block diagram of case study 1 
 
 
 
The trip valve and the control valve here are both air-to-open, which closes upon 
loss of instrument air. The signals of the temperature sensor and the controller increase 
with increasing inputs. 
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6.1.2 Database Inputs 
For the above nitric acid cooling process, one of the identified incidents can be a 
runaway reaction in the benzene reactor. Many factors, such as a large external fire 
outside the reactor and loss of reactor temperature control system, can cause a runaway 
reaction. In our system boundary, assume that the only cause of this incident is too hot 
3HNO  to the reactor. The top events table in the specific database is shown in Table 6.1 
(user-defined top event). The corresponding inputs to the gates table in the specific 
database are shown in Table 6.2. Columns with no data are not shown. 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 The top events table for case study 1 
 
Index Gate ID Description Comment 
4 1 Too hot HNO3 enters the reactor  
 
 
 
Table 6.2 The gates table for case study 1 
 
Gate ID Description Completeness Equipment ID Process Variable Deviation
1 TS-1 Tout +1 FALSE TS-1 Tout 1 
 
 
 
Some information must be read from the Visio file and stored into the equipment 
table, equipment state table, and topology table. It can be extracted automatically by the 
computer from Visio files though not implemented in this work. In this particular case, 
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the equipment state table is not used. Equipment table and topology table are shown in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Some columns with no data are not shown here for brevity. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 The equipment table for case study 1 
 
Equipment ID Boundary Equipment Type Equipment Subtype 
HE-1 FALSE Heat Exchanger Shell Tube 
Pump-1 TRUE Pump Centrifugal 
TC-1 FALSE Controller PLC 
TS-1 FALSE Temperature Sensor Thermocouple 
Valve-1 TRUE Trip Valve Pneumatic 
Valve-2 FALSE Control Valve Pneumatic 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 The topology table for case study 1 
 
ID FromEquip ID FromPort Name ToEquip ID ToPort Name 
1 HE-1 h,out TS-1 in 
2 Valve-1 out HE-1 h,in 
3 Valve-2 out HE-1 cl,in 
4 Pump-1 out Valve-2 in 
 
 
 
There are three tables relevant to component modeling, the specific digraph table, 
failure modes and effects table, and external events table, which are shown in Tables 6.5, 
6.6 and, 6.7, respectively. For brevity, only the data to be used later in this nitric acid 
cooler example are listed. These tables are for illustration purpose only since the actual 
database may have more records. To reduce the size of the fault tree, pipeline and signal 
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line failures are not taken into account in this example. In particular, the heat exchanger 
in the above system is special in that there will be an exothermic reaction if there is an 
internal leakage. This failure mode is neglected here to simplify the problem.  
 
 
 
Table 6.5 The specific digraph table input for case study 1 
 
Equipment ID State Input variable Output variable Relationship
TS-1  Tin Tout 1 
TS-1  Tin Sigout 1 
HE-1 Normal Th,in Th,out 1 
HE-1 Normal Fh,in Th,out 1 
HE-1 Normal Tcl,in Th,out 1 
HE-1 Normal Fcl,in Th,out -1 
Valve-1  Tin Tout 1 
Valve-1  Fin Fout 1 
Valve-2  Tin Tout 1 
Pump-1  Tin Tout 1 
Pump-1  Pin Pout 1 
Pump-1  Pin Fout 1 
Pump-1  Fin Fout 1 
TC-1  Sigin Sigout 1 
Valve-2  Fin Fout 1 
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Table 6.6 The specific failure modes and effects table input for case study 1 
 
Equipment 
ID 
Failure Modes Output Variable Relationship
Pump-1 leaks externally Pout -1 
Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally Pout -1 
Pump-1 discharge line block partially Pout -1 
Pump-1 leaks externally significantly Pout -10 
Pump-1 discharge line blocked Pout -10 
Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally significantly Pout -10 
Pump-1 fails while running Pout -10 
Pump-1 leaks externally Fout -1 
Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally Fout -1 
Pump-1 discharge line block partially Fout -1 
Pump-1 leaks externally significantly Fout -10 
Pump-1 discharge line blocked Fout -10 
Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally significantly Fout -10 
TC-1 fails low Sigout -1 
TC-1 fails very low Sigout -10 
TS-1 fails low Sigout -1 
TS-1 fails very low Sigout -10 
HE-1 internal fouling occurs Th,out 1 
Valve-2 leaks externally Fout -1 
Valve-2 fails low Fout -1 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 The external events table input for case study 1 
 
Equipment ID Description Output Variable Relationship 
Valve-2 loss of instrument air Fout -10 
HE-1 large external fire Th,out 10 
HE-1 external fire Th,out 1 
Valve-1 low instrument air Fout -1 
Valve-1 loss of instrument air Fout -10 
Pump-1 loss of power supply Fout -10 
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The fault tree table and the gates table will be updated automatically during the 
procedure of fault tree generation. The stack table serves the functionality of a stack 
storing all the intermediate gates. The fault tree construction procedure will keep running 
unless the stack table is empty.  
 
6.1.3 Results 
After the table inputs are ready, clicking “fault tree generator” brings a top event 
list box, in which the listed items are extracted from top events table. The program will 
continue to construct fault trees for the top event once users select one item in the list 
box. The generated gates table is shown in Table 6.8. The default gate description 
generated from this program is a combination of the equipment ID, the process variable, 
and the deviation. Users can modify it if desired. The logic between the gates are stored 
in the fault tree table, as shown in Table 6.9. Again, some columns with no data such as 
probability, time, and comment have been omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127
Table 6.8 The generated gates table for case study 1 
 
Gate 
ID 
Description Completeness Equipment 
ID 
Process 
Variable 
Deviation
1  TS-1 Tout +1 TRUE TS-1 Tout 1 
2 TS-1 Tin 1 TRUE TS-1 Tin 1 
3 HE-1 Th,out 1 TRUE HE-1 Th,out 1 
4 Uncontrollable 
disturbances 
TRUE   0 
5 Controllable disturbances 
and control inactive 
TRUE   0 
6 Controllable disturbances TRUE   0 
7 Control inactive TRUE Valve-2  0 
8 Control unhealthy TRUE Valve-2  0 
9 HE-1 Th,out 10 TRUE HE-1 Th,out 10 
10 HE-1 Th,in 10 TRUE HE-1 Th,in 10 
11 HE-1 Fh,in 10 TRUE HE-1 Fh,in 10 
12 HE-1 Tcl,in 10 TRUE HE-1 Tcl,in 10 
13 HE-1 Fcl,in –10 TRUE HE-1 Fcl,in -10 
14 HE-1 large external fire TRUE HE-1  0 
15 HE-1 Th,out 1 TRUE HE-1 Th,out 1 
16 HE-1 Th,in 1 TRUE HE-1 Th,in 1 
17 HE-1 Fh,in 1 TRUE HE-1 Fh,in 1 
18 HE-1 Tcl,in 1 TRUE HE-1 Tcl,in 1 
19 HE-1 Fcl,in -1 TRUE HE-1 Fcl,in -1 
20 HE-1 Internal fouling 
occurs 
TRUE HE-1  0 
21 HE-1 external fire TRUE HE-1  0 
22 TS-1 stuck TRUE TS-1  0 
23 TC-1 stuck TRUE TC-1  0 
24 Valve-2 stuck TRUE Valve-2  0 
25 TS-1 failure TRUE TS-1  0 
26 TC-1 failure TRUE TC-1  0 
27 Valve-2 failure TRUE Valve-2  0 
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Table 6.8 continued 
Gate 
ID 
Description Completeness Equipment 
ID 
Process 
Variable 
Deviation
28 Valve-2 Fout -1 TRUE Valve-2 Fout -1 
29 Valve-2 Fin -1 TRUE Valve-2 Fin -1 
30 Valve-2 low instrument air TRUE Valve-2  0 
31 Valve-2 leaks externally TRUE Valve-2  0 
32 Valve-2 fails low TRUE Valve-2  0 
33 Pump-1 Fout -1 TRUE Pump-1 Fout -1 
34 Pump-1 Pin -1 TRUE Pump-1 Pin -1 
35 Pump-1 Fin -1 TRUE Pump-1 Fin -1 
36 Pump-1 leaks externally TRUE Pump-1  0 
37 Pump-1 discharge line 
leaks externally 
TRUE Pump-1  0 
38 Pump-1 discharge line 
block partially 
TRUE Pump-1  0 
39 Valve-2 Tout 1 TRUE Valve-2 Tout 1 
40 Valve-2 Tin 1 TRUE Valve-2 Tin 1 
41 Pump-1 Tout 1 TRUE Pump-1 Tout 1 
42 Pump-1 Tin 1 TRUE Pump-1 Tin 1 
43 Valve-1 Fout 1 TRUE Valve-1 Fout 1 
44 Valve-1 Fin 1 TRUE Valve-1 Fin 1 
45 Valve-1 Tout 1 TRUE Valve-1 Tout 1 
46 Valve-1 Tin 1 TRUE Valve-1 Tin 1 
47 Valve-2 Fout -10 TRUE Valve-2 Fout -10 
48 Valve-2 Fin -10 TRUE Valve-2 Fin -10 
49 Loss of instrument air and 
feedforward inactive 
TRUE Valve-2 Fout -10 
50 Loss of instrument air TRUE Valve-2 Fout -10 
51 Feedforward inactive TRUE   0 
52 Valve-1 stuck TRUE Valve-1  0 
53 Pump-1 Fout -10 TRUE Pump-1 Fout -10 
54 Pump-1 Pin -10 TRUE Pump-1 Pin -10 
55 Pump-1 Fin -10 TRUE Pump-1 Fin -10 
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Table 6.8 continued 
Gate 
ID 
Description Completeness Equipment 
ID 
Process 
Variable 
Deviation
56 Pump-1 leaks externally 
significantly 
TRUE Pump-1  0 
57 Pump-1 discharge line 
blocked 
TRUE Pump-1  0 
58 Pump-1 discharge line 
leaks externally 
significantly 
TRUE Pump-1  0 
59 Loss of power supply and 
feedforward inactive 
TRUE Pump-1 Fout -10 
60 Loss of power supply TRUE Pump-1 Fout -10 
61 Feedforward inactive TRUE   0 
62 Valve-1 stuck TRUE Valve-1  0 
63 Valve-2 Tout 10 TRUE Valve-2 Tout 10 
64 Valve-2 Tin 10 TRUE Valve-2 Tin 10 
65 Pump-1 Tout 10 TRUE Pump-1 Tout 10 
66 Pump-1 Tin 10 TRUE Pump-1 Tin 10 
67 Valve-1 Fout 10 TRUE Valve-1 Fout 10 
68 Valve-1 Fin 10 TRUE Valve-1 Fin 10 
69 Valve-1 Tout 10 TRUE Valve-1 Tout 10 
70 Valve-1 Tin 10 TRUE Valve-1 Tin 10 
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Table 6.9 The generated fault tree table for case study 1 
 
ID Gate ID Type Child
15 1 OR 2 
16 2 OR 3 
17 3 OR 4 
18 3 OR 5 
19 5 AND 6 
20 5 AND 7 
21 3 OR 8 
22 4 OR 9 
23 9 OR 10 
24 9 OR 11 
25 9 OR 12 
26 9 OR 13 
27 9 OR 14 
28 6 OR 15 
29 15 OR 16 
30 15 OR 17 
31 15 OR 18 
32 15 OR 19 
33 15 OR 20 
34 15 OR 21 
35 7 OR 22 
36 7 OR 23 
37 7 OR 24 
38 8 OR 25 
39 8 OR 26 
40 8 OR 27 
41 19 OR 28 
42 28 OR 29 
43 28 OR 30 
44 28 OR 31 
45 28 OR 32 
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Table 6.9 continued 
 
ID Gate ID Type Child
46 29 OR 33 
47 33 OR 34 
48 33 OR 35 
49 33 OR 36 
50 33 OR 37 
51 33 OR 38 
52 18 OR 39 
53 39 OR 40 
54 40 OR 41 
55 41 OR 42 
56 17 OR 43 
57 43 OR 44 
58 16 OR 45 
59 45 OR 46 
60 13 OR 47 
61 47 OR 48 
62 47 OR 49 
63 49 AND 50 
64 49 AND 51 
65 51 OR 52 
66 48 OR 53 
67 53 OR 54 
68 53 OR 55 
69 53 OR 56 
70 53 OR 57 
71 53 OR 58 
72 53 OR 59 
73 59 AND 60 
74 59 AND 61 
75 61 OR 62 
76 12 OR 63 
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Table 6.9 continued 
 
ID Gate ID Type Child
77 63 OR 64 
78 64 OR 65 
79 65 OR 66 
80 11 OR 67 
81 67 OR 68 
82 10 OR 69 
83 69 OR 70 
 
 
 
As pointed out in Chapter IV, using database tables to represent the structure of 
fault trees are easy for the computer to manipulate data. However, it is not 
straightforward for users to review and modify fault trees. To solve this problem, this 
fault tree structure can be converted into Visio files by retrieving records from the gates 
table, events table, and fault tree table. The complete fault tree for case study 1 is shown 
in Figure 6.2 while the simplified fault tree is shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
 
 
 
133
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 6
.2
 T
he
 c
om
pl
et
e 
fa
ul
t t
re
e 
fo
r c
as
e 
st
ud
y 
1 
 
 
 
134
Fi
gu
re
 6
.3
 T
he
 si
m
pl
ifi
ed
 fa
ul
t t
re
e 
fo
r c
as
e 
st
ud
y 
1 
 
 
 
 
135
6.1.4 Comparison with Published Results 
Analysis of fault tree models involves Minimal Cut Set (MCS) analysis. MCSs 
are the minimal combinations of basic events that can result in the top event. The 
procedure of MCS analysis transforms the fault tree into an equivalent two-level tree, 
which is an OR gate of all the possible MCSs. After algebraic analysis, the MCSs of the 
above simplified fault tree in Figure 6.3 are listed in Table 6.10.  
Many failures in the fault tree in Figure 6.3 are not considered in the published 
fault tree in Lapp and Powers (1977). In order to compare these two fault trees, the 
analysis resolution must be consistent. By removing the MCSs containing those failures 
that are not considered in Lapp and Powers (1977, 1979) paper, we can obtain the 
following MCSs as shown in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.10 The minimum cut sets for case study 1 
 
Index MCSs 
1 HE-1 large external fire 
2 Loss of instrument air, Valve-1 stuck 
3 Pump-1 leaks externally significantly 
4 Pump-1 discharge line blocked 
5 Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally significantly 
6 Loss of power supply, Valve-1 stuck 
7 Pump-1 Pin(-10) 
8 Pump-1 Fin(-10) 
9 Valve-1 Tin(+10) 
10 Pump-1 Tin(+10) 
11 Valve-1 Fin(+10) 
12 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
13 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
14 Valve-1 Tin(+1), Valve-2 stuck 
15 Valve-1 Fin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
16 Valve-1 Fin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
17 Valve-1 Fin(+1), Valve-2 stuck 
18 Pump-1 Tin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
19 Pump-1 Tin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
20 Pump-1 Tin(+1), Valve-2 stuck 
21 Valve-2 leaks externally, TS-1 stuck 
22 Valve-2 leaks externally, TC-1 stuck 
23 Valve-2 leaks externally, Valve-2 stuck 
24 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TS-1 stuck 
25 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TC-1 stuck 
26 Pump-1 Pin (-1), Valve-2 stuck 
27 Pump-1 Fin (-1), TS-1 stuck 
28 Pump-1 Fin (-1), TC-1 stuck 
29 Pump-1 Fin (-1), Valve-2 stuck 
30 Pump-1 leaks externally, TS-1 stuck 
31 Pump-1 leaks externally, TC-1 stuck 
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Table 6.10 continued 
 
Index MCSs 
32 Pump-1 leaks externally, Valve-2 stuck 
33 Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally, TS-1 stuck 
34 Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally, TC-1 stuck 
35 Pump-1 discharge line leaks externally, Valve-2 stuck 
36 Pump-1 discharge line blocked partially, TS-1 stuck 
37 Pump-1 discharge line blocked partially, TC-1 stuck 
38 Pump-1 discharge line blocked partially, Valve-2 stuck 
39 Valve-2 fails low, TS-1 stuck 
40 Valve-2 fails low, TC-1 stuck 
41 Valve-2 fails low, Valve-2 stuck 
42 Valve-2 low instrument air, TS-1 stuck 
43 Valve-2 low instrument air, TC-1 stuck 
44 Valve-2 low instrument air, Valve-2 stuck 
45 HE-1 internal fouling occurs, TS-1 stuck 
46 HE-1 internal fouling occurs, TC-1 stuck 
47 HE-1 internal fouling occurs, Valve-2 stuck 
48 HE-1 external fire, TS-1 stuck 
49 HE-1 external fire, TC-1 stuck 
50 HE-1 external fire, Valve-2 stuck 
51 TS-1 failure 
52 TC-1 failure 
53 Valve-2 failure 
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Table 6.11 The new MCSs for case study 1 
 
Index MCSs 
1 HE-1 large external fire 
2 Loss of instrument air, Valve-1 stuck 
6 Loss of power supply, Valve-1 stuck 
7 Pump-1 Pin(-10) 
9 Valve-1 Tin(+10) 
11 Valve-1 Fin(+10) 
12 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
13 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
15 Valve-1 Fin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
16 Valve-1 Fin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
24 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TS-1 stuck 
25 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TC-1 stuck 
42 Valve-2 low instrument air, TS-1 stuck 
43 Valve-2 low instrument air, TC-1 stuck 
48 HE-1 external fire, TS-1 stuck 
49 HE-1 external fire, TC-1 stuck 
51 TS-1 failure 
52 TC-1 failure 
 
 
 
As indicated by Lapp and Powers (1979), the probability of the event “Low air 
pressure of the cooling water control valve” and the event “control valve reversed” 
occurring simultaneously is negligible. We can simply replace the EOR (exclusive or) 
gate as OR gate. The MCSs for the published fault tree in Lapp and Powers (1977) are 
listed in Table 6.12, in which equipment names are adjusted to be consistent with this 
case study for easy comparison.  
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Table 6.12 The MCSs of the published fault tree 
 
Index MCSs 
1 large external fire 
2 Loss of instrument air 
3 Pump-1 shutdown, Valve-1 reversed 
4 Pump-1 shutdown, signal line plugged 
5 Pump-1 Pin(-10) 
6 Valve-1 Tin(+10) 
7 Valve-1 Pin(+10) 
8 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
9 Valve-1 Tin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
10 Valve-1 Pin(+1), TS-1 stuck 
11 Valve-1 Pin(+1), TC-1 stuck 
12 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TS-1 stuck 
13 Pump-1 Pin (-1), TC-1 stuck 
14 Low air pressure, TS-1 stuck 
15 Low air pressure, TC-1 stuck 
16 External fire, TS-1 stuck 
17 External fire, TC-1 stuck 
18 TS-1 failure 
19 TC-1 failure 
 
 
 
The minimum cut set {Loss of instrument air, Valve-1 Stuck} is different from 
that in the published paper {Loss of instrument air}, because Lapp and Powers (1977, 
1979) did not consider the fact that the trip valve will close upon loss of instrument air. 
The signal line failures are not considered in this example, so the minimum cut set 
{Pump-1 shutdown, signal line plugged} is not in the MCSs of the fault tree generated 
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from the program. Except for the two sets mentioned above, the two minimum cut sets 
are consistent. 
 
6.2 Case Study 2 
This case study is to illustrate the “fire” top event identification procedure. 
Process description and the resultant fault tree are presented in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, 
respectively.  
 
6.2.1 Process Description 
Figure 6.4 shows a typical storage tank of flammable materials. A centrifugal 
pump is used to pump the materials to supply other processes. Here the process controls 
and safe guards are not shown since they are not related to fire event identification.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Process block diagram for case study 2 
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Assume that storage tank and centrifugal pump are the only two potential sources 
of fire in this process. The possible containment failure modes of the storage tank 
include leakage and corrosion. The pump might leak externally for the flammable 
materials to be exposed to air.  
Suppose that sprinkler fire protection system and dry chemical protection system 
are available on the site to prevent a fire from occurring. The sprinkler system may fail 
upon pre-action valve failure, fusible link failure, or human error. The dry chemical 
system fails if the manual valve is stuck or the operator does not respond.  
 
6.2.2 Results 
The above information is entered into the computer while the program prompts 
the user to input certain information step by step in “fire event identification”. The 
generated gates table and fault tree table are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14, respectively. 
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Table 6.13 The generated gates table 
 
Gate ID Description Completeness 
1  Fire occurs FALSE 
2  Fire occurs in Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
3  Ignition occurs in Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
4  Protection 1 fails FALSE 
5  Pre-action valve failure FALSE 
6  Fusible link failure FALSE 
7  Human error FALSE 
8  Protection 2 fails FALSE 
9  Dry chemical valve stuck FALSE 
10  Operator fails to respond FALSE 
11 Containment failure of Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
12  Leak externally at Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
13  Erosion occurs at Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
14  Fire occurs in Pump 1 FALSE 
15  Ignition occurs in Pump 1 FALSE 
16  Protection 1 fails FALSE 
17  Pre-action valve failure FALSE 
18  Fusible link failure FALSE 
19  Human error FALSE 
20  Protection 2 fails FALSE 
21  Dry chemical valve stuck FALSE 
22  Operator fails to respond FALSE 
23 Containment failure at Pump 1 FALSE 
24  Leak externally at Pump 1 FALSE 
25  Ignition sources at Pump 1 FALSE 
26 Ignition sources at Storage Tank 1 FALSE 
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Table 6.14 The generated fault tree table 
 
ID Gate ID Type Child 
15 1 OR 2 
16 2 AND 3 
17 2 AND 4 
18 4 OR 5 
19 4 OR 6 
20 4 OR 7 
21 2 AND 8 
22 8 OR 9 
23 8 OR 10 
24 3 AND 11 
25 3 AND 26 
26 11 OR 12 
27 11 OR 13 
27 1 OR 14 
28 14 AND 15 
29 14 AND 16 
30 16 OR 17 
31 16 OR 18 
32 16 OR 19 
33 14 AND 20 
34 20 OR 21 
35 20 OR 22 
36 15 AND 23 
37 15 AND 25 
38 23 OR 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144
The resultant fault tree is shown in Figure 6.5. The subtrees of “Protection 1 
fails” and “Protection 2 fails” appears twice in this fault tree. Their structures are shown 
in only one place for brevity. The structure is verified to be correct and complete. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 The resultant fault tree for case study 2 
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6.3 Summary of Chapter VI 
Two case studies are presented in this chapter to illustrate the methodology. The 
first one is a nitric acid cooling process adapted from Lapp and Powers (1977) paper, 
which is discussed extensively in the literature. Process description and database input 
are presented in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, respectively. The results from this 
methodology are discussed and compared with the published results, which are proved to 
be consistent. 
The second one is an example of fire event identification for a storage tank. The 
resultant fault tree structure has been reviewed for correctness and completeness. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DATA UNCERTAINTY 
 
Though the example given in this chapter is SIL determination via FTA, this 
chapter is applicable not only to FTA but also to other QRA techniques and reliability 
studies.  
The ideal situation in a reliability study is to have sufficient in-house data, 
however, due to various restrictions, laboratory data or data from generic data sources 
are often used in reliability studies, especially at the design stage. Transferring data from 
laboratory or generic data sources brings uncertainty. Traditionally, analysis uses only 
point values from generic data sources to conduct risk analysis. This can lead to 
misleading results in some cases. Data uncertainty and its impact are addressed in this 
chapter. The impact of data uncertainty on the calculation of SIL is discussed as an 
example in this chapter, and procedures are proposed to deal with data uncertainty in 
determining SIL for a safety instrumented system (SIS). 
 
7.1 Sources of Failure Rate and Event Data 
Failure rates depend on the equipment, the definition of failures, the process 
conditions, and the maintenance plan. The ideal situation for a reliability study is to have 
sufficient plant data from identical equipment from the same process. However, in many 
cases, in-house data are not always available. For new plants, there are essentially no 
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historical failure rate data. In those cases, generic data from external sources must be 
used.  
There are a number of generic data sources available from industry or 
government agencies. The choice of the appropriate generic failure rate data applicable 
for a particular chemical plant requires the knowledge of the background and data 
origins.  
The Data Acquisition Working Party of the Mechanical Reliability Committee of 
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in the United Kingdom examined principal 
available data sources and provided a summary table (Davidson, 1994). The applicable 
industry such as offshore, nuclear, industrial, or military industry has been pointed out, 
together with the equipment types that have been covered. CCPS (1991) provides a 
review of available databases and compiles equipment failure rates hierarchically. Upper 
and lower bounds are provided whenever available. It is probably the failure rate 
database most extensively used in the United States. OREDA (1984, 1988, 1997 and 
2002) is dedicated to offshore gas and oil industry and provides failure rates, failure 
mode distribution, and repair times for offshore installations. There are a variety of other 
data sources available. A comprehensive compilation of failure rate and event data can 
be found in Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Lees, 1996). It remains the user’s 
responsibility to consult the original references and choose the best source for their plant.  
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7.2 Definition of Safety Integrity Level 
A target SIL is defined during the safety requirement specification development 
for an industrial system (Summers, 1998). SILs are defined as 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the 
ISA/ANSI S84.01, as shown in Table 7.1 (ISA-TR84.00.02, 2002a), among which SIL 4 
is not used in the process industry.  
 
 
 
Table 7.1 Safety Integrity Level Performance Requirements (ISA-TR84.00.02) 
 
Integrity Level Safe Availability (%) PFDa Equivalent RRFb 
4c >99.99 <0.0001 >10,000 
3 99.9-99.99 0.001-0.0001 1,000-10,000 
2 99-99.9 0.01-0.001 100-1,000 
1 90-99 0.1-0.01 10-100 
0 (control - N/A) 
 aPFD= Probability of failure on demand. 
bRRF=Risk reduction factor (1/PFD). 
cISA and AIChE documents restricted to 3 levels. 
 
 
 
According to the standards, the ability of an SIS to achieve a specific SIL must 
be validated at each stage of design and prior to any changes made to the design after 
commissioning. The entire operation, testing, and maintenance procedures and practices 
are also verified for agreement with the target SIL. Thus, determining SIL for an SIS and 
its validation is very important for conformance to ISA/ANSI-S84.01. 
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e) was provided to 
describe various methodologies for the determination of SIL of Safety Instrumented 
 
 
 
149
Functions (SIF) and to reinforce the concept of the performance based evaluation of an 
SIS. Three techniques, simplified equations (ISA-TR84.00.02, 2002b), FTA (ISA-
TR84.00.02-2002c), and Markov modeling (ISA-TR84.00.02, 2002d, 2002e) can be 
used to model the interaction and functionality of basic SIS components.  
 
7.3 Data Uncertainty 
Simplified equations, FTA, and Markov modeling all require failure rates of 
equipment and operators. Statistical data are used to calculate the overall system safety 
availability or SIL. There are many factors that determine the failure rates of equipment 
and the range of failure rates observed can be quite wide. It is necessary to consult the 
original sources to take full advantage of the available information. The failure rates of 
equipment can be influenced by a large number of factors, including design, 
specification, manufacture, application, operation conditions, maintenance, and 
environment. In the process industry, the operating conditions and environment can 
change dramatically for the same equipment. The most desirable information is to have 
sufficient plant specific data to determine the SIL for any SIF. However, in many cases, 
equipment has not been operating long enough to provide statistically valid data, internal 
collection may not be appropriate, or for new plant designs there is no possibility to 
collect any in-house failure data. Laboratory data and generic data are often used in 
determining the SIL of an SIS, especially at the design stage. Point values from these 
data origins are normally used to obtain a point estimation of SIL.  
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However, measuring and collecting data have uncertainty associated with them, 
and borrowing data from laboratory and generic data sources involves an element of 
uncertainty as well. Reliability data can often deviate by a factor of three or four, and a 
factor of ten is not unusual, as suggested by Kletz (1999). Nowadays, Monte Carlo 
simulation is extensively employed to treat data uncertainty. However, in the case of 
failure rate data, Monte Carlo simulation might be inappropriate since most of the 
available failure rates are only point values without information about their distributions. 
Only a few reliability databases provide upper and lower bounds and confidence levels 
of the failure rate data. Assumption of any failure distribution introduces an 
unpredictable uncertainty. Some modern reliability databases do provide upper and 
lower values on failure rates, like IEEE-Std-500 (IEEE-Std-500, 1984), OREDA (1984, 
1992, 1997, 2002) and CCPS (1991). The EIREDA (1998) databank provides 
confidence levels with error factors. These upper and lower bounds and error factors can 
be used advantageously to derive ranges of failure rate data. 
Using point values of failure rates may result in misleading evaluation of SIL for 
a SIS, which is illustrated in Figure 7.1. Using point values of some data, the result 
perfectly falls into SIL 3, while the data uncertainties associated with them might lead to 
a SIL 2 result. 
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             • 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The impact of data uncertainty on SIL determination 
 
 
 
The impact of data uncertainty on the calculation of SIL is discussed and 
illustrated in the example below. Here we propose a procedure to examine the impact of 
data uncertainty on the SIL estimation and deciding the inputs that may lead to a change 
of SIL. Due to the fact that SIL is a mono-increasing function of any single failure rate 
and failure rates are bounded by 0 and 1, ranges for input data that will not lead to a 
change of SIL are calculated by hand or with the help of a computer. These ranges are 
then compared to known ranges of these input data or expert opinions. Effort must be 
carried out to obtain more accurate values of those data that might actually lead to a 
change of SIL. This methodology helps the analyst to identify critical failure rate data 
that impact the SIL estimation and focus on these data to refine them. This procedure is 
elaborated further in the following example. 
 
7.4 Example 
We use the base case example from ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 (2002c), and 
assumptions are clearly stated in ISA-TR84.00.02-2002. As mentioned in ISA-
TR84.00.02-2002, data in this example are for illustration purpose only. The example is 
an SIF to protect a storage tank by measuring pressure, flow rate, temperature, and liquid 
SIL 4 SIL 3 SIL 2 SIL 1 
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level. Logic voting is employed in the logic solver. The process diagram for the example 
is shown in Figure 7.2, and the schematic configuration of this SIF is shown in Figure 
7.3. The fault tree model of probability of failure on demand (PFD) for this SIF example 
is shown in Figure 7.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Process diagram of example (ISA-TR84.00.02, 2002c) 
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Figure 7.3 Schematic SIF configuration of example (ISA-TR84.00.02, 2002c) 
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Figure 7.4 Probability of failure on demand fault tree for example SIF (Wang, West, & 
Mannan, 2004) 
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The PFDavg data for the individual components used in this example are shown in 
Table 7.2. The calculated overall system PFDavg is 7.41*E-3, which falls into SIL 2 
according to Table 7.1. Then the tight upper bounds of the input data that will not lead to 
a change of SIL are calculated, and the results are shown in Table 7.2. Any deviation of 
the input data beyond these upper bounds results in a change in the SIL estimation. 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 PFDavg data and calculated ranges for the components (Wang, West, & 
Mannan, 2004) 
 
Devices PFDavg Upper bound that will not 
lead to a change of SIL 
Flow Transmitters 1.26*E-2 3.16*E-2 
Pressure Transmitters 1.00*E-2 5.20*E-2 
Temperature Switch 3.26*E-2 6.06*E-2 
Level Switch 1.99*E-2 5.50*E-2 
Block Valves 1.00*E-2 4.55*E-2 
Solenoid Valves 1.00*E-2 4.55*E-2 
Logic Solver (E/E/PES) 5.00*E-3 7.60*E-3 
 
 
 
The calculated upper bounds of these data are then compared to their actual 
ranges due to uncertainty with them. The actual ranges can be obtained from some data 
banks or from expert judgment. If the actual ranges of the failure rates have the 
possibility of exceeding beyond their calculated ranges, uncertainty with these particular 
data may lead to a change in the estimation of SIL. It will be necessary and beneficial to 
examine the data and extract more accurate values for those data. As suggested by Kletz 
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(1999), it is not uncommon for the failure rates to deviate by a factor of 3 or 4, and a 
factor of ten is not unusual. Though in this case, we do not have any actual ranges for 
these failure rates to compare with. From Table 7.2, we can notice that most of the 
calculated ranges fall within a factor of 1.5 ~ 5. Especially in the case of logic solver, a 
relatively small increase in failure rates (about 50%) will result in a lower estimation of 
SIL. More effort is required to examine and justify those data. 
This example has a fault tree of moderate size for SIF in the process industry. In 
case of large fault trees, it is extremely difficult to obtain all these ranges by hand. 
However, this problem can be addressed with the help of computers. FTA is used in this 
example. However, extension to simplified equations, Markov modeling and other 
evaluation techniques is straightforward. 
 
7.5 Summary of Chapter VII 
This chapter discussed failure rate data sources, their uncertainty, and the impact 
of uncertainty on reliability studies. In the process industry, operating conditions and 
environment can change dramatically for the same equipment, and the range of failure 
rates observed can be quite wide. Traditional reliability studies using point values of 
failure rates may result in misleading conclusions. The impact of data uncertainty on the 
calculation of SIL is discussed as an example in this chapter. It may not be practical to 
research extensively to obtain more accurate estimation for all the failure rate data used 
in a reliability study, and procedures to deal with data uncertainty in determining SIL for 
an SIS are proposed to help engineers find the failure rate data that needs refinement and 
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further examination. Effort must be carried out to obtain more accurate values of those 
data that might actually lead to a change of SIL. This procedure will guide SIS designers 
and process hazard analysts toward a more accurate SIL estimation and avoid misleading 
results due to data uncertainty. 
Data sources are discussed in Section 7.1 briefly. Section 7.2 gives the definition 
of SIL. The current status of data uncertainty has been discussed in Section 7.3. An 
example from ANSI/ISA 84.01 is discussed in Section 7.4. Though the example given in 
this chapter is SIL determination via FTA, this chapter is applicable not only to FTA but 
also to other QRA techniques and reliability studies.  
It has to be emphasized that the uncertainty with the model itself (simplified 
equations, FTA and Markov modeling) is not covered in this work. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
Minor incidents and near misses are very common in the process industry, 
occurring daily. Major incidents have made the public aware of the potential hazards 
associated with industrial activities. Investigations of almost all the major incidents show 
that we could have avoided those tragedies with effective risk management programs. 
Despite the fact that FTA is one of the best tools available for a comprehensive 
reliability study, the current application of FTA in the CPI is unfortunately limited. One 
major barrier is the manual construction of fault trees, which can be highly subjective 
and dependent on the expertise of the analyst. While there are well-developed 
commercialized software packages for fault tree evaluation, no satisfactory methodology 
for fault tree synthesis has been published. The availability of a computer-based analysis 
methodology that simplifies the system understanding process and takes a structured 
approach to develop fault trees would greatly increase the attractiveness of FTA 
techniques in the CPI. 
This dissertation proposes a systematic and computerizable computer-aided 
methodology for fault tree synthesis for chemical processes. The basic idea is to capture 
the cause-and-effect logic among equipment behaviors, human responses, and 
environment factors for each item of equipment directly into mini fault trees. Special 
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fault tree models have been developed to manage special features such as control loops, 
trip systems, pressure relief systems, and bypasses. Consistency checking and fault tree 
simplification procedure are proposed, and fault trees created by this methodology are 
expected to be correct and concise. Ideally, FTA can be standardized through a computer 
package that reads information contained in process P&IDs and provides automatic aids 
to assist engineers in generating and analyzing fault trees. 
A database structure has been designed and a prototype computer program is 
provided to illustrate and test the proposed methodology against some examples. The 
results generated from the program have been compared to published results and verified 
to be correct.  
Dearth of failure rate data and the large uncertainty associated with the data are 
considerable problems in the application of FTA. This research proposed a deductive 
procedure to identify those data that may result in a wrong estimation of SIL for a SIS. 
This procedure guides SIS designers to focus on those data that require further 
refinement and avoid misleading results due to data uncertainty. 
A computer is never and will never be a substitute for a human being. Many of 
the problems in the system design can be discovered during analysis of a process, and it 
is not recommended to rely wholly on computer-aided approaches. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
This work proposes a computer-aided methodology for fault tree synthesis. 
Though this work is originally developed for the application in the CPI, it has the 
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extendibility to other fields such as electrical systems, the nuclear industry, and the 
aerospace industry.  
Many special features are designed to prevent incidents, which are crucial in the 
synthesis of fault trees. In particular, complex chemical processes may not only have 
process control loop and safety-related functions, but also process loops. Every loop in 
the process under study needs to be identified but also classified according to its 
structural characteristics and functionalities. It is rather difficult to automate the loop 
identification and classification. In this work, configuration of special features is entered 
manually by users. Though it has been recognized that a mechanistic approach for the 
recognition of all the special features is not appropriate for fault tree synthesis in the 
CPI, guidelines and taxonomy to help analysts in identifying and classifying special 
features systematically is valuable and highly desired.  
As mentioned, the ultimate goad of this research is to standardize the procedure 
of QRA and help decision makers to decide more formally and more cost-effectively. 
Risk is defined to be a function of both consequence and frequency. Fault trees are 
normally used to estimate the probability of concerned incidents, whereas a systematic 
and powerful consequence analysis methodology is valuable to obtain an overall 
measure of risk.  
Finally, risk presentation and communication is a must for decision makers to 
understand the results from risk analysis correctly and efficiently and convert them to 
correct decisions for sustainable development of their enterprise.  
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